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Re:Rust 1.100.0 by SOLAR_FIELDS on Thursday November 12, 2026 @08:09PM (#50476790)
Dependency cooldowns receiving such a whiplash this year. Earlier everyone was advocating for them because of the supply chain attacks. Now, people are worried because you might miss 0 days if you use them.

Nonetheless, the ability to set and configure it is a welcome feature.

Re:Rust 1.100.0 by saghm on Thursday November 12, 2026 @09:29PM (#50477345)
Some of us were saying they didn't understand the endgame of everyone using cooldowns at the time. We mostly got told we were wrong though.
Re:Rust 1.100.0 by woodruffw on Thursday November 12, 2026 @09:45PM (#50477439)
You should do both: you should let normal updates cool down, and you should immediately patch security advisories.

One of the biggest ergonomic problems with cooldowns is that many tools let the former goal obstruct the latter. Both should be part of the state machine of resolution itself, rather than things that get layered on.

Re:Rust 1.100.0 by PaoloBarbolini on Friday November 13, 2026 @02:31AM (#50479649)
There are many cases in which security advisories aren't published. But I guess an alternative could be to update using the cooldown, and then diff the dependencies that would get a newer version if the cooldown wasn't in place to check if they contain anything relevant for the particular application you're developing.
Re:Rust 1.100.0 by ninkendo on Friday November 13, 2026 @06:56AM (#50482232)
[delayed]
Re:Rust 1.100.0 by woodruffw on Friday November 13, 2026 @07:58AM (#50482871)
> If it’s just a box you check, it only means attackers will say “this is a security update” on the malicious package they upload.

It generally requires additional permissions, per the adjacent respond. And it introduces additional scrutiny on the release, which is the last thing an opportunistic attacker wants (the entire reason “supply chain” attacks are effective is because nobody gives any thought to upgrading their dependencies in the normal case).

Re:Rust 1.100.0 by kragen on Friday November 13, 2026 @07:01AM (#50482295)
Usually people advocate dependency cooldowns as a mitigation for supply-chain attacks, where you're depending on a module with a malicious maintainer, possibly a new one (perhaps one who stole the old maintainer's keys so they can pretend to be the old maintainer).

In that situation, how do you distinguish between "normal updates" (that you should let cool down) and "security advisories"? If all the hypothetical malicious maintainer has to do to get you to update is to publish a security advisory for their own package, wouldn't they just do that? It might even be a real advisory about a real security hole that they introduced, but claiming more versions are affected than actually are affected.

Re:Rust 1.100.0 by woodruffw on Friday November 13, 2026 @07:48AM (#50482755)
It takes additional permissions, in general, to issue an advisory. And “supply chain” attacks in general tend to be used by smash-and-grab attackers, who don’t have time on their side. It’s not like a browser 0day where the attacker’s goal is to preserve their underlying exploit primitive for as long as possible.
Re:Rust 1.100.0 by kragen on Friday November 13, 2026 @09:57AM (#50484477)
Additional permissions?
Re:Rust 1.100.0 by woodruffw on Friday November 13, 2026 @01:08PM (#50487370)
I’m talking about things like GHSAs. You can’t issue one just by compromising a push credential to a repository, which is how most of these supply chain attacks start.
Re:Rust 1.100.0 by jmvoodoo on Friday November 13, 2026 @07:38AM (#50482674)
Waiting for someone to hold back a vulnerability until they can compromise a package, then release vuln publicly for maximum impact.

It’s only a matter of time.

Re:Rust 1.100.0 by derefr on Saturday November 14, 2026 @01:29PM (#50499464)
Why wouldn't a supply-chain attacker simply use a security advisory to push their attack through?
Re:Rust 1.100.0 by zarzavat on Thursday November 12, 2026 @10:42PM (#50477955)
You should use a cooldown. The effects of a supply chain attack are significantly worse than the effects of a 0 day. You can always make exceptions on a case-by-case basis.
Re:Rust 1.100.0 by dns_snek on Friday November 13, 2026 @04:40AM (#50480794)
[delayed]