News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:Rust 1.100.0 by kragen on Friday November 13, 2026 @07:01AM (#50482295)
Usually people advocate dependency cooldowns as a mitigation for supply-chain attacks, where you're depending on a module with a malicious maintainer, possibly a new one (perhaps one who stole the old maintainer's keys so they can pretend to be the old maintainer).

In that situation, how do you distinguish between "normal updates" (that you should let cool down) and "security advisories"? If all the hypothetical malicious maintainer has to do to get you to update is to publish a security advisory for their own package, wouldn't they just do that? It might even be a real advisory about a real security hole that they introduced, but claiming more versions are affected than actually are affected.

Re:Rust 1.100.0 by woodruffw on Friday November 13, 2026 @07:48AM (#50482755)
It takes additional permissions, in general, to issue an advisory. And “supply chain” attacks in general tend to be used by smash-and-grab attackers, who don’t have time on their side. It’s not like a browser 0day where the attacker’s goal is to preserve their underlying exploit primitive for as long as possible.
Re:Rust 1.100.0 by kragen on Friday November 13, 2026 @09:57AM (#50484477)
Additional permissions?
Re:Rust 1.100.0 by woodruffw on Friday November 13, 2026 @01:08PM (#50487370)
I’m talking about things like GHSAs. You can’t issue one just by compromising a push credential to a repository, which is how most of these supply chain attacks start.