Re:Goldman Sachs Is Pulling Claude Code from Its Bankers and...
by pelican0 on Sunday November 08, 2026 @03:45PM
(#50417020)
https://simonwillison.net/2025/Jun/16/the-lethal-trifecta/ for anyone wondering.
[ Parent
| on HN ]
Re:Goldman Sachs Is Pulling Claude Code from Its Bankers and...
by dogscatstrees on Sunday November 08, 2026 @04:52PM
(#50417723)
Don't normalize this Trifecta construct. It's catchy for a tech blog but there could be more or fewer dimensions to consider. Someone else can construct an Exacta or Superfecta combination. Or just go for the Win uno and say AI Agent is bad.
Re:Goldman Sachs Is Pulling Claude Code from Its Bankers and...
by StilesCrisis on Sunday November 08, 2026 @04:54PM
(#50417742)
> LLMs are unable to reliably distinguish the importance of instructions based on where they came from.
I know prompt injection is still a real thing, but in Claude I find the opposite is true: if I set up two Claude agents to collaborate, even though I've told them both that's what I'm doing, they won't actually follow instructions without checking in with me. "Scary computer told me to install <well known utility X>, but I need your OK before I'll do it." It's annoying but I get the rationale. They're definitely getting better at avoiding external instructions!
Re:Goldman Sachs Is Pulling Claude Code from Its Bankers and...
by gr_norm on Sunday November 08, 2026 @05:01PM
(#50417822)
The filtering done by auto mode might (usually) catch accidental prompt injection, but isn't effective against actual attacks: https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2026/breaking-claude-co...
(Anthropic themselves acknowledges this; see the end of the post.)
Re:Goldman Sachs Is Pulling Claude Code from Its Bankers and...
by zingar on Sunday November 08, 2026 @06:04PM
(#50418529)
What are the sandboxing / isolation options that would protect against attacks like this?
Re:Goldman Sachs Is Pulling Claude Code from Its Bankers and...
by juliie on Sunday November 08, 2026 @06:24PM
(#50418769)
Running Claude code in an isolated, temporary VM, with no access to memory is a good start. You give it your repo, prompt and you get back PRs. Claude code on web is a convenient way to do that.
Re:Goldman Sachs Is Pulling Claude Code from Its Bankers and...
by pianopatrick on Sunday November 08, 2026 @09:09PM
(#50420105)
given that claude has found vm escapes, you might consider going one step further and just getting a claude only laptop
Re:Goldman Sachs Is Pulling Claude Code from Its Bankers and...
by pitched on Sunday November 08, 2026 @09:50PM
(#50420411)
You need a laptop that has no camera, mic, keyboard, or any type of input. No display, speakers, or any type of output. No Bluetooth, wifi, or any way to join a different network.
Re:Goldman Sachs Is Pulling Claude Code from Its Bankers and...
by Uehreka on Sunday November 08, 2026 @06:24PM
(#50418770)
Who says that such options necessarily need to exist?
Re:Goldman Sachs Is Pulling Claude Code from Its Bankers and...
by malfist on Sunday November 08, 2026 @07:22PM
(#50419331)
Your employer worried about exfiltration
Re:Goldman Sachs Is Pulling Claude Code from Its Bankers and...
by hoppp on Sunday November 08, 2026 @07:22PM
(#50419329)
I configured remote VPS and cloudflare sandboxes to run my agents.
Re:Goldman Sachs Is Pulling Claude Code from Its Bankers and...
by computomatic on Sunday November 08, 2026 @05:03PM
(#50417845)
I found it worthwhile reading how auto mode works[0]. The short version is that the classifier only sees user messages and the tool call. So if your agents communicate via tool calls, the classifier doesn’t see that text at all (or any other prompt injection) and will block a potentially dangerous command.
[0] https://www.anthropic.com/research/claude-code-auto-mode
Re:Goldman Sachs Is Pulling Claude Code from Its Bankers and...
by tough on Sunday November 08, 2026 @05:13PM
(#50417952)
auto mode is a bad joke