Yes - but those examples don't all have the same risk modalities. With dams and reactors, many failure variables can be permanently contained by initial system design/engineering and construction quality, continually inspected surroundings and internals, and physically known certainty. Human inputs are limited and daily inspection matters, but any momentary error or lapse of operator attention won't result in instant destruction. You have hours and days with Dams, minutes and hours with reactors. In aviation it only takes a split second.

Aviation involves constant unpredictable human inputs and physical states. Hundreds of vehicles, not installations. It is not yet solved, the status quo merely has a societally tolerable death rate. There are additional sensors, safety redundancy automations, and info synthesis/notification interfaces that are currently blocked by certain old hardware bottlenecks.

> Controller and pilot time and attention is limited, and it can be wasted less.

And inversely... when pilots leave too much to automation, their skills may degrade to the point that by the time you actually need a capable human crew because something has gone terribly wrong, the capability of that crew has degraded too much, and the FAA has warned about this in the past [1].

[1] https://medium.com/faa/the-dangers-of-overreliance-on-automa...