Re:Dutch 'idealist' bank ASN blocks non-Google Android, incl...
by ledoge on Friday November 06, 2026 @08:56AM
(#50392334)
I don't think the attack can work as described here. One of the features that GrapheneOS lists is:
> Insider attack resistance for updates to the secure element (Owner user authentication required before updates are accepted)
From my understanding, this means that even if you do have the signing keys, you cannot install an update that would remove the need for knowing the screen lock to unlock the filesystem's encryption - as installing such an update requires entering the screen lock first.
Re:Dutch 'idealist' bank ASN blocks non-Google Android, incl...
by Gander5739 on Friday November 06, 2026 @09:48AM
(#50392968)
To my knowledge this is true for normal android as well (perhaps not that authentication is required); the data is encrypted against the passcode.
Re:Dutch 'idealist' bank ASN blocks non-Google Android, incl...
by microtonal on Friday November 06, 2026 @11:49AM
(#50394846)
But the phones were also under some form of MDM, maybe they could have used that?
Re:Dutch 'idealist' bank ASN blocks non-Google Android, incl...
by buzer on Friday November 06, 2026 @01:45PM
(#50396541)
However if you have signing keys and access to the update delivery infra you could just publish the update and wait for it to get auto updated before starting to seize the phones.
According to our information, the reseller did not distribute official GrapheneOS. Using AI tools, he had built his own fork and added mobile device management (MDM) for remote administration. The result was a separate operating system that lacked, among other things, the security updates of the original project.
His signing keys for that system were probably compromised. Anyone holding those keys can build an update that the phones accept as genuine. Such an update was apparently installed on seized phones via ADB (Android Debug Bridge), an interface that requires a USB cable connection, and probably removed the screen lock. The phones could then be examined forensically. On our information, the authorities again needed the phone in their hands. On official GrapheneOS, the same approach would require the project's own signing keys.
https://www.joint-defense-team.com/post/grapheneos-cracked-p...