Even if they wanted to, I highly doubt they could push the industry to do that. The industry does what it wants to do, and rewriting tons of software was far from its priorities.
There's also the fact that rewriting software tends to introduce a lot of new bugs.
Memory safe languages are not a silver bullet either.
Basically, the borrow checker allowed writing memory unsafe programs without using the keyword unsafe.
Compilers for C, C++ etc. are well established but Rust is a relatively new language. There are many bugs to come just like this.
Using a memory safe language is not a silver bullet for writing memory safe code. The implementation of the memory safe language introduces bugs as well.
The distance between the usual consumer/b2b tech startup and the kind of company that sells software to the air force is even bigger than the distance between Google and the kind of company who hires Accenture.
Did you even read my comment? I very explicitly answered this.
Government purchasing requirements have an immense effect on industry. IME/PSP/TrustZone have 99% CPU coverage because NSA put "owner-inaccessible oversight processor with disjoint physical address space" into federal sourcing requirements.
They could easily have done the same with "memory-safe language". Note this is not the same as "must use Ada" which is obviously dumb. The IME/PSP/TrustZone req worked so well because they specified the feature not the implementation (and indeed it has been implemented three different ways).
But instead, NSA actively pushed in the opposite direction and funded all sorts of kludges to try to keep memory-unsafe languages kicking as long as possible.
They have actively sabotaged the national security of their own country.
Yeah, about that. Its the biggest vulnerability in the industry. Nobody wants to confront this fact, though.
Too much profit to be made in in oppression/human rights abuses.
" In 2013, The New York Times reported that documents in their possession but never released to the public "appear to confirm" that the backdoor was real, and had been deliberately inserted by the NSA as part of its Bullrun decryption program. In December 2013, a Reuters news article alleged that in 2004, before NIST standardized Dual_EC_DRBG, NSA paid RSA Security $10 million in a secret deal to use Dual_EC_DRBG as the default in the RSA BSAFE cryptography library, which resulted in RSA Security becoming the most important distributor of the insecure algorithm. "
People seem to be fine with it as long as their own team seems to be profiting from it - but for those of us who are not subject citizens of the NSA's government, it is a truly heinous state of affairs.
NSA spent 20 years stockpiling vulns and pushing the industry towards half-assed solutions like address sanitization and pointer tagging when they could have put the industry on memory-safe languages instead.
They managed to get the IME/PSP/TrustZone into 99% of the CPUs out there by mandating it for government purchases; they could have done the same thing with memory-safe languages. But instead they chose to stockpile vulns. Hope they burn in hell for this.