Re:Cursor 0day: When Full Disclosure Becomes the Only Protec...
by shitter on Tuesday July 14, 2026 @08:22PM
(#48914693)
? Doesn’t the code exec happen upon merely launching Cursor against a repository, without giving an agent any tasks? That’s clearly an issue at the Cursor application level, not some inevitable risk caused by the non-deterministic nature of LLMs. You can’t use the latter fact to excuse the former mistake
Not to mention that Cursor has an agent permissions model that this presumably sidesteps!
Re:Cursor 0day: When Full Disclosure Becomes the Only Protec...
by cute_boi on Tuesday July 14, 2026 @11:18PM
(#48915843)
I agree cursor can fix the issue, but the main issue is downloading anything from untrusted source. The repo may have AGENTS.md which can tell please install npm package from random repo and run pnpm start etc...
We should never ever download any pdf or excel macros etc.. from untrusted source.
Re:Cursor 0day: When Full Disclosure Becomes the Only Protec...
by iainmerrick on Wednesday July 15, 2026 @08:23AM
(#48919732)
If you can’t download anything safely, the web can’t exist.
Re:Cursor 0day: When Full Disclosure Becomes the Only Protec...
by hnfong on Wednesday July 15, 2026 @09:38AM
(#48920671)
If we take your logic to the extreme, then there are never any legitimate code execution vulnerabilities in web browsers since the user is not supposed to visit untrusted websites.
Re:Cursor 0day: When Full Disclosure Becomes the Only Protec...
by cute_boi on Friday July 17, 2026 @02:26PM
(#48950586)
Correct, we shouldn't visit untrusted website unless it is from trusted source like banks etc.. There is reason why scamming is billion dollar industry.
Re:Cursor 0day: When Full Disclosure Becomes the Only Protec...
by thewhitetulip on Tuesday July 14, 2026 @10:03PM
(#48915392)
Cursor is used for vibe coding. There are people who used Cursor to build a webapp where passwords are printed on the front page
So yeah, this is a major issue
Re:Cursor 0day: When Full Disclosure Becomes the Only Protec...
by brookst on Wednesday July 15, 2026 @12:32AM
(#48916329)
Different layers, different risks.
You do not expect an agent-level app to run untrusted binaries. You expect prompt injection, etc.
And I don't at all agree that a malicious executable landing in some directory is already game over. Plenty of zip files have malicious executables, it doesn't mean you say "oh, my zip extractor should just run every executable because if one's bad I'm already toast".
Check (and double check and triple check) your sources. If a malicious executable made it to your computer it is already too late.