Maybe I'm projecting my own biases ;-)
I do wonder though: if you can tell the AI to search for vulns, can't you also tell it to contact the right maintainer for each one found?
So, knowing that bad actors have an unending river of cheaply acquired zero days, the best response is to publish them so that maintainers also have access to them. Existing methods of slow disclosure cannot keep up with the AI firehose.
It’s ugly, but it will force needed change. A thorough AI red team effort is the lowest bar of releasing software responsibly in this day and age.
All this is doing is making the AI firehose worse.
I’m onboard with this being suboptimal. But as someone who has filed >10 significant disclosures in the last month resulting from reviewing my codebase and had exactly zero responses, I can relate to the decision.
> but it's probably worth noting that "RMI" stands for Remote Method Invocation
This reminds me of someone submitting a (clearly vibecoded) vulnerability report claiming to have found a way to execute arbitrary SQL. The project in question? An SQL server... https://github.com/tursodatabase/turso/pull/4322
After a bit of research, the Firefox one seems plausible to me. But, I haven't actually tried the POC. The explanation about the private-data and untrusted-input flags is plausible but I'm not an expert on Firefox's internals, maybe that's not actually how it works.
This just sucks, all around. Are we going to need every open source project gawking at the same repo full of stuff that has nothing to do with them, on the off chance that someone discloses a vuln that does have to do with them? Is this some kind of performative complaint about high friction in responsible disclosure? Well great job dickhead, you've just made a system that's even worse. Nobody benefits from this. Yuck yuck yuck.
Disclosures always enable more secure software to theoretically exist,
even if nobody follows through creating it.
They often do.
The biggest mitigation is that gitea documentation discourages you from using action runners from untrusted users. Not flawless security, but it's something...
This recommendation seems incompatible with third-party collaboration, at least on its face!
Does it? Or does it need to be in the same directory you invoked ghidra?
There'd be a certain irony being able to reverse shell anyone doing an nmap scan. If i had infinite tokens i'd throw claude on writing an exploit and dig through the history who made it possible because - if we take a moment to wildly speculate and assume it can ACE - this is the kind of bug an intelligence agency would love to have: Add a few ipv6 packets that then edit the trace being observed if the observer uses nmap / get access to any researcher pc who uses nmap.
"Why don't we unpack malware in the kernel" - "And so the search for intelligent life continues..."
Media codecs pretty much, single-handedly even, drove about a new era of defenses and mitigations in Android: https://blog.isosceles.com/the-legacy-of-stagefright / https://archive.vn/x3d0Y
Every TV / movie hacker has known about this.
code execution js code execution, if reached through some bug or executing code that was not intended to be executed its bad, even if the mechanism is kind of obvious and trivial, it still can lead to unexpected code to be launched.
the repo also notes low quality of some POC like ones you noted.
its correct to be a bit wary and i wouldnt call it some crazy 0day dropping account or anything, but bugs/vulns are bugs an vulns and simply because you are not impressed by their complexity, it does not reduce them entirely. just makes em lil less scary.
the ghidra one, it reminds of things like unquoted service paths in windows services. its a silly thing and clearly its bad but it still happens and gets companies pwned :'). a lot of companies use ghidra actively and if you imagine what kind, you'd hope they will not allow the overwriting of those swift binaries ;p. some pentester bound to have a laugh.
Ah, MS07-052[1] ("code execution leads to code execution") strikes again. These sorts of "if you allow arbitrary code to be executed, code will be executed" "vulnerability" reports seem evergreen
[1]: https://devblogs.microsoft.com/oldnewthing/20070807-00/?p=25...
By mass sharing these kinds of gaps and utilising mythos tier LLM's ability to find and combine multiple disparate bits of information together, are we increasing it's capabilities and versatility?
The first requires being able to overwrite binaries in the Swift tool directory. Yes, if you overwrite binaries executed by ghidra, you can trigger code execution. This is not a surprise.
The second, idk, I'm not familiar with TraceRMI.
The third is not a vulnerability in the slightest, they just demonstrate that native 7zip parsing code is reachable. Maybe there is a bug in the 7zip parser, but without that it's meaningless.