Range voting has the same advantage. In computer simulations measuring how well the election result matches voter preferences, either range or approval is as much an improvement over plurality as plurality is over picking someone at random (or, if you like, monarchy). http://rangevoting.org/BayRegsFig.html
Anyway, apparently, with "Inter-temporal choice", or, different utility of the same thing measured in different time periods, Cardinal Utility needs to be used.
I wonder if the same applies to grouping utility of different people together in order to get an aggregate. If so, it's an argument for the use of Approval/Score voting as opposed to Ranked choice.
The quote is "Models of utility with several periods, in which people discount future values of utility, need to employ cardinalism in order to have well-behaved utility functions." an appears in the cardinal utility article.
In this two system the idea is that you get very little information from the voters (best candidate / a set of candidates) and don't know all the information about the order of preference and the relative strength. So I don't understand why having less information is better (theoreticaly).
A ranked-choice ballot only encodes the orders the candidates against one another, whereas approval and score votes also encode the candidates' positions within the voter's range of subjective preferences. That is, if we have 3 candidates (A, B, C) and a few voters which each voters has a range from love to hate for each candidate, like so:
Love Hate
|-A--B-------------------C-|
|-A-------------B-----C----|
|-------------------A-B-C--|
|-A-B---C------------------|
Under ranked choice voting, every one of these voters' ballots would look the same: 1)A, 2)B, 3)C
Ranked choice voting encodes the ordering of the preferences, but the intensity of those preferences is lost when the ballot is cast. Whereas under approval and score voting, every one of these voters represents their preferences differently, because they're reflecting their personal response to each candidate: Approval | Disapproval
|-A--B-----|-------------C-|
|-A--------|----B-----C----|
|----------|--------A-B-C--|
|-A-B---C--|---------------|
Of course, some information is lost in the fact that we only have 2 values approval/disapproval to encode positional preferences. But I would argue this information is already more meaningful than a fully-expressed ranked ballot. And if necessary, score voting can capture more of that information by offering > 2 levels to divide the candidates into.If in a hypothetic population everyone loves/hates each candidate equally spaced, then in that population it is possible to apply the Arrow's theorem and prove that for that population this method doesn't work. But the method should be useful for every population, even the pathological ones.
http://www.electology.org/score-voting
Eric Sanders of that same organization has written a few articles on the subject, including the following:
http://bigthink.com/action-in-action/why-the-republicans-los...
I've personally been trying to campaign for the adoption of score voting:
https://usa.brianstaskforce.com/task/362/score-voting-for-na...
A possible counter-argument to this is that score voting doesn't have a reinforcing feedback loop (each election, the minor parties get weaker until they remain at around 1%)
I know I would not hesitate to vote my actual opinion and I suspect others would not either. I would be happy to give a score to each candidate, and it would not necessarily be binary. Just as I am happy today to vote for a third-party candidate though that is not a strategic move.
Again speaking just for myself, if nothing else, having the ability to score candidates would reduce my feeling of regret or disappointment with the outcome because it's less polarizing.
So do I vote 0/0/1 or 0/1/1? Well, that depends on how popular the three are and is very much an example of strategic voting.
When proposing an alternative, one should probably be up-front with its flaws.
"In voting systems, tactical voting (or strategic voting or sophisticated voting or insincere voting) occurs, in elections with more than two candidates, when a voter supports a candidate other than his or her sincere preference in order to prevent an undesirable outcome.[1]"
If you mean it in the larger sense of using strategy when voting, Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem shows that no voting system is strategy free unless it's either dictatorial or nondeterministic.
Most traditional voting methods are preference systems: You take your N candidates and rank them from 1 to N. Every voter is assumed to have a "ground truth" preference of ranking. Tactical voting means that a rational voter may sometimes be encouraged to vote with a ranking other than their true preference.
The weaker criteria that approval voting satisfies is this: A rational voter can always make a rational vote by writing down their true preference ranking in order, drawing a line, and approving everyone above that line. In other words, there is no situation where a rational voter would want to vote A > B when their true preference is B > A. This is a significant bound on the effects of tactical voting.
As you correctly point out, the rationally optimal place to draw that line can be tactical. Nonetheless, there is a strong argument that this is "less tactical" than many other systems allow.
The current system (assuming you're not from Australia) - plurality (or first-past-the-post) voting - is literally the least representative voting mechanism. Tell me where you see IRV as having a worse-case than plurality/FPTP.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_instant_runoff_vo...
We can visualize this like so:
# Approval | Disapproval
80 |-1--2----|--------------3-|
20 |-2-------|-----------3--1-|
So while the first candidate is the favorite candidate of the super-majority, the second candidate has the unanimous approval of population. Which is preferable? I would say the second candidate.So you see, the criteria themselves incorporate an ideological perspective - a majoritarian bias - rather than articulating some absolute objective truth.
Also I have to take issue with the basis for the "Especially Intolerable Failures" explanation - does it make sense to reject a system for being theoretically capable of producing a result, "regardless of the probability that these paradoxes may occur"? Given 2 systems, one which exhibits several flaws often, and another which rarely exhibits flaws but is theoretically capable of exhibiting a certain offensive flaw, does it make sense to reject the better-behaving system because of a theoretical result? I think not.
No, but if we want to go on the basis of how likely it is to produce those outcomes, Instant-runoff voting beats approval voting by a long shot. Amartya Sen has shown that, not only is IRV is highly unlikely to produce an outcome which violates transitivity and independence, but if ideologies are assumed to be relatively linear[1], then it never violates those conditions.
[1] Ie, very few people would rank Nader > Bush > Gore
I'd also consider a non-majority approval victory a highly desirable outcome, and the way politics goes right now, it'd be more like a 40% candidate with 85% approval beating a 51% candidate with 51% approval.
http://www.electology.org/approval-voting
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Approval_voting