"In voting systems, tactical voting (or strategic voting or sophisticated voting or insincere voting) occurs, in elections with more than two candidates, when a voter supports a candidate other than his or her sincere preference in order to prevent an undesirable outcome.[1]"
If you mean it in the larger sense of using strategy when voting, Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem shows that no voting system is strategy free unless it's either dictatorial or nondeterministic.
Most traditional voting methods are preference systems: You take your N candidates and rank them from 1 to N. Every voter is assumed to have a "ground truth" preference of ranking. Tactical voting means that a rational voter may sometimes be encouraged to vote with a ranking other than their true preference.
The weaker criteria that approval voting satisfies is this: A rational voter can always make a rational vote by writing down their true preference ranking in order, drawing a line, and approving everyone above that line. In other words, there is no situation where a rational voter would want to vote A > B when their true preference is B > A. This is a significant bound on the effects of tactical voting.
As you correctly point out, the rationally optimal place to draw that line can be tactical. Nonetheless, there is a strong argument that this is "less tactical" than many other systems allow.
The current system (assuming you're not from Australia) - plurality (or first-past-the-post) voting - is literally the least representative voting mechanism. Tell me where you see IRV as having a worse-case than plurality/FPTP.
So do I vote 0/0/1 or 0/1/1? Well, that depends on how popular the three are and is very much an example of strategic voting.
When proposing an alternative, one should probably be up-front with its flaws.