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Re:Voting is a Sham Mathematically Speaking by bradbeattie on Tuesday November 27, 2012 @04:29PM (#4839184)
Let's say there are two head-line candidates: A and B. I hate A, am neutral towards B, and love the less popular of the three candidate C.

So do I vote 0/0/1 or 0/1/1? Well, that depends on how popular the three are and is very much an example of strategic voting.

When proposing an alternative, one should probably be up-front with its flaws.

Re:Voting is a Sham Mathematically Speaking by jivatmanx on Tuesday November 27, 2012 @04:54PM (#4839344)
That's not strategic voting according to the definition. In both cases you're still voting for C, the candidate you like the most.

"In voting systems, tactical voting (or strategic voting or sophisticated voting or insincere voting) occurs, in elections with more than two candidates, when a voter supports a candidate other than his or her sincere preference in order to prevent an undesirable outcome.[1]"

If you mean it in the larger sense of using strategy when voting, Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem shows that no voting system is strategy free unless it's either dictatorial or nondeterministic.

Re:Voting is a Sham Mathematically Speaking by bradbeattie on Tuesday November 27, 2012 @06:05PM (#4839826)
My decision to vote either 0/0/1 or 0/1/1 is explicitly to prevent my desire for B over A from causing B to win when C might have a chance. Whenever you have to consider the ballots of other voters, you're dealing with tactical voting.
Re:Voting is a Sham Mathematically Speaking by lmkg on Tuesday November 27, 2012 @06:40PM (#4840000)
Approval voting is immune to a particular definition of tactical voting, which is somewhat weaker than the traditional one. Which isn't perfect, but it's better than most other methods can offer.

Most traditional voting methods are preference systems: You take your N candidates and rank them from 1 to N. Every voter is assumed to have a "ground truth" preference of ranking. Tactical voting means that a rational voter may sometimes be encouraged to vote with a ranking other than their true preference.

The weaker criteria that approval voting satisfies is this: A rational voter can always make a rational vote by writing down their true preference ranking in order, drawing a line, and approving everyone above that line. In other words, there is no situation where a rational voter would want to vote A > B when their true preference is B > A. This is a significant bound on the effects of tactical voting.

As you correctly point out, the rationally optimal place to draw that line can be tactical. Nonetheless, there is a strong argument that this is "less tactical" than many other systems allow.

Re:Voting is a Sham Mathematically Speaking by pc86 on Tuesday November 27, 2012 @04:55PM (#4839347)
Would it be better to have something like 0/1/2 which is essentially IRV, or some other method of point distribution among candidates?
Re:Voting is a Sham Mathematically Speaking by autarch on Tuesday November 27, 2012 @05:01PM (#4839396)
No, IRV actually makes the strategic voting problem even worse than our current system. Approval voting seems to have the best mix of desirable traits.
Re:Voting is a Sham Mathematically Speaking by r00fus on Tuesday November 27, 2012 @07:00PM (#4840076)
[cite needed]

The current system (assuming you're not from Australia) - plurality (or first-past-the-post) voting - is literally the least representative voting mechanism. Tell me where you see IRV as having a worse-case than plurality/FPTP.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instant-runoff_voting