Anyway, apparently, with "Inter-temporal choice", or, different utility of the same thing measured in different time periods, Cardinal Utility needs to be used.
I wonder if the same applies to grouping utility of different people together in order to get an aggregate. If so, it's an argument for the use of Approval/Score voting as opposed to Ranked choice.
The quote is "Models of utility with several periods, in which people discount future values of utility, need to employ cardinalism in order to have well-behaved utility functions." an appears in the cardinal utility article.
In this two system the idea is that you get very little information from the voters (best candidate / a set of candidates) and don't know all the information about the order of preference and the relative strength. So I don't understand why having less information is better (theoreticaly).
A ranked-choice ballot only encodes the orders the candidates against one another, whereas approval and score votes also encode the candidates' positions within the voter's range of subjective preferences. That is, if we have 3 candidates (A, B, C) and a few voters which each voters has a range from love to hate for each candidate, like so:
Love Hate
|-A--B-------------------C-|
|-A-------------B-----C----|
|-------------------A-B-C--|
|-A-B---C------------------|
Under ranked choice voting, every one of these voters' ballots would look the same: 1)A, 2)B, 3)C
Ranked choice voting encodes the ordering of the preferences, but the intensity of those preferences is lost when the ballot is cast. Whereas under approval and score voting, every one of these voters represents their preferences differently, because they're reflecting their personal response to each candidate: Approval | Disapproval
|-A--B-----|-------------C-|
|-A--------|----B-----C----|
|----------|--------A-B-C--|
|-A-B---C--|---------------|
Of course, some information is lost in the fact that we only have 2 values approval/disapproval to encode positional preferences. But I would argue this information is already more meaningful than a fully-expressed ranked ballot. And if necessary, score voting can capture more of that information by offering > 2 levels to divide the candidates into.If in a hypothetic population everyone loves/hates each candidate equally spaced, then in that population it is possible to apply the Arrow's theorem and prove that for that population this method doesn't work. But the method should be useful for every population, even the pathological ones.
Range voting has the same advantage. In computer simulations measuring how well the election result matches voter preferences, either range or approval is as much an improvement over plurality as plurality is over picking someone at random (or, if you like, monarchy). http://rangevoting.org/BayRegsFig.html