Re:The foundations of a provably secure operating system (PS...
by fsflover on Monday May 18, 2026 @07:43AM
(#48178298)
What is wrong about virtualization? It allows to run all existing software, it doesn't restrict the owner of the device, it is extremely flexible and reliable. And it can be fast, too.
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Re:The foundations of a provably secure operating system (PS...
by Joel_Mckay on Monday May 18, 2026 @07:48AM
(#48178352)
see other comment, the author describes some issues with current hardware virtualization. kvm is also pretty good, but not perfect... and completely irrelevant with GPU pass-through enabled. =3
Re:The foundations of a provably secure operating system (PS...
by fsflover on Monday May 18, 2026 @07:54AM
(#48178425)
Which other approach to security do you consider reliable? Through correctness? Through obscurity?
https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2008/09/02/three-approaches...
Re:The foundations of a provably secure operating system (PS...
by Joel_Mckay on Monday May 18, 2026 @07:59AM
(#48178465)
Publicly documented encrypted mmu, as it is the only practical way to isolate contexts on parallel cores.
Or some exotic processor no one would ever sell successfully. =3
Re:The foundations of a provably secure operating system (PS...
by Rohansi on Monday May 18, 2026 @10:32AM
(#48180462)
What would an encrypted MMU do differently?
Re:The foundations of a provably secure operating system (PS...
by Joel_Mckay on Monday May 18, 2026 @10:58AM
(#48180804)
Mitigates undetectable bleeding/contamination of information between parallel processes, cores, and or rowhammer etc.
Thus, writing a robust and secure OS may actually be possible by competent programmers in most compiled languages. Best of luck =3
Re:The foundations of a provably secure operating system (PS...
by Rohansi on Monday May 18, 2026 @11:38AM
(#48181321)
But how does it accomplish that? And how can you guarantee it would solve those hardware issues?
Re:The foundations of a provably secure operating system (PS...
by Joel_Mckay on Monday May 18, 2026 @01:35PM
(#48182715)
The memory areas would appear as ciphertext to other processes/unprivileged-cores in most cases even when hardware has glitched up. If you are asking how they specifically implemented the mmu <-> unreachable key handling outside the OS, that information was never public if I recall.
I've often pondered how it was really implemented too. Best of luck. =3
"Why Multi-Threaded Code Can Sometimes Misbehave (Weak Memory Concurrency)" (Computerphile)