At the moment though, the preconditions look very odd. I've been using nginx in various constellations for 10 years and never once combined rewrite and set.
Not extremely common, but it does happen.
Kind of feels like the burden is on the one who is reading it though, good luck stopping people from spreading misinformation on the internet, most of them don't even know they're wrong.
What's extremely harmful is trusting random internet comments stating stuff confidently. Get good at seeing through that, and it'll serve you well in security and beyond.
I disagree with this take, or I would at least phrase it differently. ASLR is like an extra password you need to guess. It has certain amount of entropy and it is usually stable. Unless vulnerability has a portion that leaks information, ASLR completely mitigates it - or you need a second vulnerability. And that is a different conversation. ASLR can completely mitigate individual vulnerability, but not possibly exploit chain.
I would use the argument of possible second vulnerability that leaks information for making people patch quickly anyway. But exploit chains are risk for all kinds of vulns.
History shows that "meh, ASLR mitigates this" is a vastly bolder claim anyway, so I don't feel much need to defend my position here.
Edit: Even the authors of this poc seem to agree with me https://depthfirst.com/research/nginx-rift-achieving-nginx-r...
Obviously you need to defend, that is quite generalization there. You need to prove how the vulnerability itself reduces the entropy of ASLR.
The authors don't really give support for that. They just say that they can brute-force it without crashing the whole Nginx. But they don't say how the entropy is reduced. They have zero information where the child process even starts, whether they hit the child, or if it even is the same child. So you should provide us technical and precise reasoning why it is not mitigating?
> You need to prove how the vulnerability itself reduces the entropy of ASLR
Not really? Looks like we have a controlled-length overflow on a fork-based server, a situation where ASLR is known to not be very useful.
It does not work like that - it has certain pre-condition requirements. You also need a reliable oracle which tells information when you actually hit the child process, whether child crashes and whether you are even in the same child. When you can retrieve this information, you are then removing re-randomization between attempts. That reduces the entropy, but it only helps if remaining search space is small enough. They don't show that they have oracle.
Additionally, for RCE, you need to find libc base and that is randomized alone. Authors just ignored in the post how they got that address. For that, you most likely need the information leak from second vulnerability, even if you can brute force the actual vulnerability.
Why are you assuming there's any re-randomization going on? There isn't. That's a proposed mitigation to address this known problem with fork-based servers.
I suppose to keep the password analogy together, people reuse passwords all the time, timing attacks exist, etc?
You can safely assume a 1:1 overlap between the people that claim "AI will solve cyber" (and they always say 'cyber') and the people saying this.
It's a matter of time before this exploit is chained with an ASLR bypass, but it allows for a slightly wider patch window at the very least.
I just finished upgrading a weird embedded box that required compiling a static nginx binary and moving it over. It's more annoying than apt update;apt upgrade or whatever your OS distribution needs, but it's still not that hard.
ASLR is a defense-in-depth technique intended to make exploitation more difficult. In almost all cases it is only a matter of time and skill to also include an ASLR bypass. Both requirements continue being lowered by LLM agents every few weeks. It is only a matter of time (and probably not a lot of time) until a fully weaponized exploit is developed. It may be published, it may also be kept private.
It is straight up wrong to say "if you have ASLR enabled, you're not at any risk from this" and saying this is extremely harmful for anyone that trusts claims like that.
This wrong belief that you shouldn't care about security vulnerabilities because mitigations may make exploitation more difficult has already caused so much harm in the past. Be glad that modern mitigations exist, but patch your stuff asap. If you are a vendor, do not treat vulnerability reports as invalid because the researcher has not provided an ASLR bypass. Fix the root cause and hope mitigations buy you enough time to patch before you get owned.