kro

Yes, if it requires the user session (xss related), like the article, there is no problem.

I was replying more generally about the "don't click links" advice and cases of server generated confirmation-token links (not saying this was the case at OpenAI)

If they or their company use email "security" software that "scans" all links it's not necessarily the users fault / they don't in fact click. The mail is auto-confirmed the second it hits the inbox.

We've had to change our registration confirmation mails too recently to not confirm on GET only, but with another form - in hindsight it was stupid before but many services do that.

Last time I gave that a try (without LLM assistance though) it was really hard as games DirectX calls cannot simply be glued to WebGL so performance was bad.

Out of curiosity: How?

They don't offload TLS to the kernel, do they? Most apps do it in userspace linked against openssl afaik.

Do you patch that lib? If ebpf "just" operates at network/packet level, I don't see how it can do more than Mitmproxy in regard to avoid DH-PFS/Pinning

It does not even require the PoW thing Anubis does. I've setup a simple logic that just:

Checks for existence of a specific static cookie, if it does not exist, output a small page that sets the cookie via JS and reloads. Sadly this kills Noscript, but it would be possible to add a form in <noscript> that when submitted sets the cookie serverside.

Is this trivial to bypass? Yes. It still keeps out 95% of unwanted bots. Reality is most do not target you specifically they just want to mass-scrape with low effort. Running headless browsers is way more expensive for their op

I've extended this with a FCRDNS checked exclusion for Googlebot.

Another quite effective measure I figured out was checking the existence of Sec-Fetch-Dest header if the User-Agent claims to be a modern browser. If you don't want to close down too much.

I understand that most people don't use it and indeed rely on tofu, but the statement is not absolutely correct.

ssh server keys can be authenticated using (the DNSSEC "CA" system and) SSHFP, and it's possible to setup a signing CA for the host key (similar to ssh certificates, however not applicable for foreign servers). And of course, the fingerprint could be advertised out of band e.g. on the homepage with tls

Only 1.31.0 and 1.31.1 are affected.

These commits [1] are related to the issue. I am not too familiar with the code, but it appears nginx manages/closes streams in a pool at times the attacker cannot control, and during short windows, it is vulnerable.

[1]:

https://github.com/nginx/nginx/commit/ceccdbd2ee799d020a371b...

https://github.com/nginx/nginx/commit/9e293766e73c469c015df5...

I did that for a while because of compatibility issues with a newer laptop, it works but generally if there is no reason it's way easier to stay with the provided packages. Compiling weekly due to security patches becomes annoying over time for no real gain other than the version number

mysql/maria also lets you turn off/down the isolation level for queries if you know the guarantees aren't needed, to speed things up. I think postgres does not have that option.

I've been receiving loads of spam from google MX servers lately until blocking all mails with X-Google-Group-Id headers. I don't know how it's possible, the contents were 100% spammer controlled, no Google template

You are correct.

Reminds me, we once got a letter by a German government body requesting some data exports from our company, and to upload them on findrive-ni.de

It turned out to be legit, but it's neither a subdomain of the state of Niedersachsen domain nor referenced in their official sites.

That also often shoots you as when json_encoding it only becomes an array when ordered "correctly" (numeric 0-based keys without gaps), otherwise an object. So to be safe you generally need to array_values after filtering. If in your testdata you only remove elements from the end you don't catch that before production data hits.

To get the first element there also is reset().

I love PHP though.

Sounds good - which software supports this? Specifically I'd prefer if it would do a composite key derivation in-time rather than "just a pw prompt but TPM has the full key"

Ubuntu also released TPM based FDE a few versions ago. I had these thoughts then and decided against using it. Typing my passphrase on boot is muscle memory and gives me simple security I can trust.

Also can recover data without my mainboard.

Maybe a hybrid (secureboot-TPM+phrase) slot for day to day to also prevent against evil maid attacks, and another slot with a backup passphrase would be acceptable.

No remotely reachable vuln should be taken lightly.

At the moment though, the preconditions look very odd. I've been using nginx in various constellations for 10 years and never once combined rewrite and set.

However, some privs can be gained in namespaces/unshare.

It says coordinated distro release today, and I've received a notice earlier today but that does not include the CVE number. That's confusing / does not seem very coordinated to release 2 separate security update notices in a day.

https://lists.debian.org/debian-security-announce/2026/msg00...

Next easy attack vector is (non-rootless) docker run with rootfs mount, many are in docker group even when sudo is protected. Also, most sensitive data is in the user scope anyways (on a PC).

You should always run dev stuff in containers to start with. And when your system is compromised, reprovision from a higher scope, too many places to hide backdoors

So far all the information suggested to disable esp and rxrpc modules.

This bulletin suggest that more modules are necessary for complete mitigation

Containers, even with root user, are often stripped of these capabilities unless --privileged

VPN usage increased, but how to they draw the conclusion that this is children. I think it's more likely that adults are using VPNs to not have to deal with the ID process. I would do that.

As VPNs usually cost some money, which is already a barrier for minors.

CAP_NET/SYS_ADMIN is required for this. So this would be "not as bad" as the others.

It's scary to think that some day it will be more than a local attack vector. I don't want to imagine the fallout from a remote rce via tcp/ip.

These copyfail exploits allow an unprivileged (daemon/app) user (not in sudoers) to get root without interaction from the original system maintainer.

It's quite different from PATH-injecting an already privileged user.

Also, these memory corruptions can likely be used as container escape primitives too. Albeit not easily.

It's a serious break of a security boundary. Yes, container layer adds defense, and normal unix security isn't perfect, but it should not allow this.

Maybe it would be reasonable for sysadmins to proactively whitelist used / block all exotic unused modules that are not needed in their system configuration.

This would reduce the amount of ring 0 code. But I've never seen such advice.

That is true, but if at least the widely used ones would get notified before that would be beneficial. If they have a responsible security contact point.

- Debian

- Ubuntu

- Arch

- Amazon/Azure

- Fedora/RHEL

Major os vendors will publish pages with the fixed versions:

https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-31431

https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-31431

Also, disabling algif_aead is suggested as mitigation