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Re:Debian must ship reproducible packages by PunchyHamster on Sunday May 10, 2026 @11:15AM (#48084652)
that's example of attack reproducible packages do not protect from, why you are linking it ?
Re:Debian must ship reproducible packages by fsflover on Sunday May 10, 2026 @11:23AM (#48084719)
A distro automatically verifying that installed packages are reproducible would protect the user?
Re:Debian must ship reproducible packages by dvogel on Sunday May 10, 2026 @12:49PM (#48085507)
No, it wouldn't. The xzutils attacker compromised the source repository. The build pipeline portions were used to obscure the purpose of the exploit embedded in the source code repository.
Re:Debian must ship reproducible packages by theteapot on Sunday May 10, 2026 @08:40PM (#48089743)
Your wrong. It was both. The payload was embedded in the binary blob test file. The mechanism to pull it into the build was added to the release tarball only.

Here's the quote from the guy that discovered it in the initial public disclosure [1]:

  After observing a few odd symptoms around liblzma (part of the xz package) on Debian sid installations over the last weeks (logins with ssh taking a lot of CPU, valgrind errors) I figured out the answer. The upstream xz repository and the xz tarballs have been backdoored. At first I thought this was a compromise of debian's package, but it turns out to be upstream. One portion of the backdoor is *solely in the distributed tarballs* and debian's import of the tarball ... it is also present in the tarballs for 5.6.0 and 5.6.1.

[1]: https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/03/29/4
Re:Debian must ship reproducible packages by dvogel on Monday May 11, 2026 @01:42AM (#48091397)
You're mistaking a compromised build pipeline versus a compromised source repo that only triggers in some build pipelines. You can do reproducible builds from compromised source tarballs. Nothing about reproducible builds necessarily requires source control. Yes, if some people who built from source control compared their builds to the builds from the tarballs it could detect the xzutils compromise. However I have yet to see a reproducible build project that includes such cross-build checks.
Re:Debian must ship reproducible packages by uecker on Monday May 11, 2026 @02:16AM (#48091587)
Nowadays you would work in git and then you would be able to easily detect any discrepancy between the upstream tar ball and the upstream source imported via git. But yes, better support for securing more of the process is needed.
Re:Debian must ship reproducible packages by theteapot on Monday May 11, 2026 @02:27AM (#48091668)
> Yes, if some people who built from source control compared their builds to the builds from the tarballs it could detect the xzutils compromise.

Good. Then we are on the same page.

Re:Debian must ship reproducible packages by theteapot on Sunday May 10, 2026 @08:33PM (#48089691)
In xz-utils hack the attacker slipped changes into the Github release tarball that were not present in the Github version / git commit history. The Debian maintainer built from the release tarball instead of just pulling from the git repo directly. Shouldn't have been doing that but good luck convincing him not to use the workflow he's been using for the last X years (I tried). With repro builds we can clone the git directly confirm we get the same build.