There are so many vectors for malware, can't say I'm just going to accept this one on pure "because it's possible."
Petya/NotPetya, Alureon, Carberp/Rovnix, Gapz, LoJax (firmware rootkit!).
All of these attacks would be thwarted by SB (and in Petya's case, simply having UEFI enabled at all, since that was only for BIOS machines)
SecureBoot ensures a valid, signed OS is installed and that the boot process generally hasn't been completely compromised in a difficult-to-mitigate manner. It provides a specific guarantee rather than universal security. Talking about "many vectors" has nothing to do with SecureBoot or boot-time malware.
Car accidents kill and injure LOTS OF PEOPLE EVERY DAY. Provably, and the burden to require the installation of, and -- more importantly -- to use one, is tiny.
Boot malware is nothing like this, either in magnitude of harm nor in ease of use by the user.
This is perhaps closer to preventing car theft by adding facial recognition software that renders the car unusable.
Fir starters, UEFI Secure Boot is actually rater bad at protecting users from bootkits or kernel-mode malware or anything, really. You can search this very website to get a giant list of bypasses and news about leaked vendor keys. Not to mention the fact that CrowdStrike Falcon incident had clearly demonstrated that Microsoft is more than happy to sign utterly insecure garbage.
Also, the issues with boot malware and kernel verification could be solved in many other ways, many of which are much more sensible or elegant. For example, by storing the bootloader and its keys on a physically separate read-only medium.
The issues with UEFI Secure Boot are actually the main point of the system, just like the issues with Windows executable signing are the whole point of that system.