What isn't visible to root? Maybe if you're willing to go down a really deep rabbit hole you can play that game, but I would generally explicitly exclude root from my threat model.
He's explicitly not using export, so they won't show up there. Plain variables are not in the environment.
(it's good to bring up this file as well as getting inherited by child processes though)
Oh, memfd_secret?
The memory areas backing the file created with memfd_secret(2) are visible only to the processes that have ac‐
cess to the file descriptor. The memory region is removed from the kernel page tables and only the page tables
of the processes holding the file descriptor map the corresponding physical memory. (Thus, the pages in the re‐
gion can't be accessed by the kernel itself, so that, for example, pointers to the region can't be passed to
system calls.)Before Linux 6.5, memfd_secret() was disabled by default and only available if the system administrator turned it on using "secretmem.enable=y" kernel parameter. [...]
"To prevent potential data leaks of memory regions backed by memfd_secret() from a hybernation image, hybernation is prevented when there are active memfd_secret() users."
Your justification is the kind of thing I mention as out-of-scope (for my purposes!) in my conclusion:
> There are also many bases that I don’t cover and routes through which sufficiently-smart malware could easily still obtain the secrets I’m working with.
/proc/$pid/environ, /proc/$pid/mem and other such vectors (ptrace, bpftrace, equivalents on other platforms) are real, but:
- they're not vectors of _accidental_ leakage like dumping the full process environment to logs or shell history are
- they rely on privileged access existing at the time that I'm handling the secret, while logs or shell history can be obtained _in the future_
- they're not the kind of thing I expect broad-spectrum malware to go rooting for: the memory of all processes is a lot of data to classify/exfiltrate, and if I were a malware author I'd fear that that would be far too resource-intensive and thus conspicuous. Browser cookie storage, password manager databases, keylogging, and the like are much easier and more valuable pickings.
PuTTY has added a -pwfile option for use in ssh. If not exported, this interface is likely the best for non-key batch use. It seems much superior to sshpass.
The old .netrc format can be adapted for storage (which appears popular for curl), but I prefer sqlite databases, with permissions removed for all but the owner.