Re:Handling secrets (somewhat) securely in shells
by chasil on Tuesday January 13, 2026 @11:46PM
(#46612450)
I believe that unexported shell variables will be visible in /proc/*/mem, so it would be prudent to overwrite then unset them as soon as reasonably possible in their usage.
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Re:Handling secrets (somewhat) securely in shells
by evgpbfhnr on Tuesday January 13, 2026 @11:57PM
(#46612506)
mem, yes, definitely. I'm not sure how you can protect yourself from that (or root user using ptrace or equivalent debugging tool) though...
Oh, memfd_secret?
The memory areas backing the file created with memfd_secret(2) are visible only to the processes that have ac‐
cess to the file descriptor. The memory region is removed from the kernel page tables and only the page tables
of the processes holding the file descriptor map the corresponding physical memory. (Thus, the pages in the re‐
gion can't be accessed by the kernel itself, so that, for example, pointers to the region can't be passed to
system calls.)
Re:Handling secrets (somewhat) securely in shells
by CableNinja on Wednesday January 14, 2026 @01:00AM
(#46612839)
Hm, this is interesting. What kernel version did you find this in? Im curious if this is exposed to other languages
Re:Handling secrets (somewhat) securely in shells
by sllabres on Wednesday January 14, 2026 @01:22AM
(#46612959)
From the man page: Linux 5.14.
Before Linux 6.5, memfd_secret() was disabled by default and only available if the system administrator turned it on using "secretmem.enable=y" kernel parameter. [...]
"To prevent potential data leaks of memory regions backed by memfd_secret() from a hybernation image, hybernation is prevented when there are active memfd_secret() users."