Fwiw back in 1996 or 97 the UPS website did the same thing. By altering the tracking number you could see somewhat complete information on someone else's shipment. Since the tracking numbers ran in sequence from the shippers log books giving one tracking number from a competitor you could see all their customers. (To get that all you had to do was place a single order so they shipped to you. Although I guess it wouldn't have been even easier to social engineer someone to simply give you any tracking number and save that step.)
I agree with silhouette. These guys scaffolded a rails project and and then slapped bootstrap on it. You can't trust an MVP this extreme.
The fact that the results are so different is irrelevant - the attack vector was essentially the same.
Also, even with the complete lack of security on this site, it should still not be possible to take any action on the victim's AWS account. IAM has read-only roles for this exact reason - hopefully no-one was negligent enough to post their master AWS key/secret in to this or any other third-party site.
Obviously if there is a known attack vector, you would fix any similar issues everywhere, but not all code is the same.
In practical terms, of course the nature of data that is disclosed is relevant. AWS keys are incredibly valuable, and should be treated as such.
Package weight
Shipping date
Who signed for it (last name)
Where package was left
Town delivered to
When delivered
And some other nominal info.
In the old days you saw exactly who the shipper was and detailed info on the recipient and recipients address. There was probably other info but what I've listed is what I remember. I remember thinking at the time that it would be valuable and contain exactly what a competitive company would need to gather a list of potential customers.
I go one step further. I refuse to give information that provides more access to a business than they need to have or that can even affect any other service I receive from anywhere else.
Here, I'd like to give them a key that works only with glacier vaults that they have created, and nothing else. If this isn't possible, then I'll go without.
I'm pretty sure a lot of successful startups were started by people who had "absolutely no idea what they were doing". Give them a break...
The big fuck-up is when they told anyone with key problems to contact the guy who found the issue. That's why we should consider them unprofessional. The security holes were accidents. The blamestorm was deliberate.
That wasn't merely a "security vulnerability". It was also a demonstration that the people running the business have absolutely no idea what they are doing when it comes to security, privacy, or testing and release processes. (Actually, there is an alternative explanation, which is even worse: they knew and didn't care. I prefer to assume naivety rather than malice.)
Unfortunately, the only sensible action when faced with a business like this is to run away and not look back for a very long time, except perhaps to check who the people responsible were so you can avoid anything else they work on in the near future as well.