I agree with silhouette. These guys scaffolded a rails project and and then slapped bootstrap on it. You can't trust an MVP this extreme.
The fact that the results are so different is irrelevant - the attack vector was essentially the same.
Also, even with the complete lack of security on this site, it should still not be possible to take any action on the victim's AWS account. IAM has read-only roles for this exact reason - hopefully no-one was negligent enough to post their master AWS key/secret in to this or any other third-party site.
Obviously if there is a known attack vector, you would fix any similar issues everywhere, but not all code is the same.
In practical terms, of course the nature of data that is disclosed is relevant. AWS keys are incredibly valuable, and should be treated as such.
Package weight
Shipping date
Who signed for it (last name)
Where package was left
Town delivered to
When delivered
And some other nominal info.
In the old days you saw exactly who the shipper was and detailed info on the recipient and recipients address. There was probably other info but what I've listed is what I remember. I remember thinking at the time that it would be valuable and contain exactly what a competitive company would need to gather a list of potential customers.
Fwiw back in 1996 or 97 the UPS website did the same thing. By altering the tracking number you could see somewhat complete information on someone else's shipment. Since the tracking numbers ran in sequence from the shippers log books giving one tracking number from a competitor you could see all their customers. (To get that all you had to do was place a single order so they shipped to you. Although I guess it wouldn't have been even easier to social engineer someone to simply give you any tracking number and save that step.)