Re:NoLongerEvil-Thermostat – Nest Generation 1 and 2 Firmware
by gruez on Tuesday November 04, 2025 @06:26PM
(#45817086)
>I would expect a newer device would have the trust root pinned in hardware (TPM, etc) and firmware updates would be have been authenticated.
All those things cost money in hardware or development time, so companies basically never bother. You're probably also letting all the stories about DRM on phones or whatever color your experience on IOT as a whole. TPM basically makes no sense to implement on anything that's not a PC. Not even phones use it.
Re:NoLongerEvil-Thermostat – Nest Generation 1 and 2 Firmware
by subscribed on Tuesday November 04, 2025 @07:28PM
(#45817603)
Secure phones use it. IPhones (Secure Enclave), Pixels (Titan M2).... Yeah, that's not much....
Re:NoLongerEvil-Thermostat – Nest Generation 1 and 2 Firmware
by gruez on Tuesday November 04, 2025 @08:15PM
(#45817903)
"TPM" =/= Secure Enclave =/= Titan M2
You could argue TPM can work as a generic term for security coprocessors, but on a technical forum that makes as much sense as saying the pixel tablet is an "iPad".
Re:NoLongerEvil-Thermostat – Nest Generation 1 and 2 Firmware
by EvanAnderson on Tuesday November 04, 2025 @08:38PM
(#45818047)
To be fair, I was using TPM a little genetically (hence the "etc"). I (perhaps wrongly) assume most SoC's today have a non-volatile area for storing roots of trust and possibly a bootloader. My only embedded experience was an Android-based tablet project where DRM on the firmware was of major import because features were locked behind time/geo-limited license keys.
Re:NoLongerEvil-Thermostat – Nest Generation 1 and 2 Firmware
by tracker1 on Tuesday November 04, 2025 @06:21PM
(#45817047)
I'm glad they didn't go that far... I wouldn't want that to get into a home device as long as it requires physical access to bypass/update the security in place. I'm really not a fan of excessively locked down hardware.
Edit: Guess I've got openssl in my termux environment. They're injecting a fake Nest root CA key. Makes sense.
I'm shocked it was this easy to subvert the root of trust on these devices. I would expect a newer device would have the trust root pinned in hardware (TPM, etc) and firmware updates would be have been authenticated.