Which means that even after logging out of pandora, the password would remain in the HTML local storage, and could be de-obfuscated, and log back into pandora.
I am currently working on reverse-engineering the obfuscation algorithm...
And I was right: the JSON object that it stores in the HTML local storage is merely obfuscated with static keys, not encrypted. I was able to decrypt the full object, including my Pandora password:
lastUserId: "xxxxxxxxx"
storedUserIds: ["xxxxxxxxx"]
Uxxxxxxxxx.StationSortOrderAlpha: false
Uxxxxxxxxx.isAnonymous: false
Uxxxxxxxxx.Username: "[email protected]"
Uxxxxxxxxx.Password: "myCleartextPassword"
hasLoggedIn: true
(xxxxxxxxx) is the numeric Pandora user ID.
I will publish an tool for decryption as a proof-of-concept, in the next hour.What were Pandora's developers thinking? This is not a huge flaw, but they should certainly not store sensitive data like the user's password in the local storage.
Pandorhack: Stealing Pandora Passwords http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=4553184
Good job!
> This is not a huge flaw, but they should certainly not store sensitive data like the user's password in the local storage.
Well, if it was properly encrypted, I'd disagree with you, but since it isn't, I'm not going to quibble.
Out of curiosity, how do you know the key is static, and not per account? Did you test with two accounts?
Here's the thing: if someone has this kind of access to your browser, wouldn't it be simpler to install a simple browser plug-in that scrapes off any data typed in to a password input field?
It's just sad seeing Pandora raked over the coals for this when they clearly have put in a lot of thought and done things as right as possible given their constraints.
I am 99% sure I am right, all the fields/values are merely obfuscated with a constant key. Not proper encryption at all.
Yes, this is what I was saying.
> I am 99% sure I am right, all the fields/values are merely obfuscated with a constant key. Not proper encryption at all.
Okay, so if I tell you my key for the field is: bc673ea54a2b7153aaafbf178e9b0892e1f2e56be5aaa5a7, can you discern my key? I'm betting not.
First, this is indeed obfuscation. There undoubtedly is a constant key. The point is merely to make it difficult for an attacker to automate an attack with "grab the attribute with key X". It's possible these attributes are HMAC's of the attribute name + a randomly generated secret, which is actually a pretty good use of encryption under the circumstances. It's certainly miles beyond what most other sites use, and makes attacks against the HTML5 a waste of time (way better to go after the elements in the DOM, which have constant names).
The state of typical security in software projects of the 1990's: sad, sad... Any improvement in 2012: such a piddling little improvement. The trend is clear as is the conclusion: the average dev can't be trusted to do security. It doesn't work!
Actually, it is the thing that I was referring to. Doing things with the key names is another thing -- wily and probably benefits them a little, but it isn't real security.
The real, major issue here is the fact that passwords are loaded into an HTTP-served page and displayed back to the user. It doesn't matter how it happens behind the scenes - the fact that someone can do either of the following is still majorly problematic:
1. Walk up to a computer you're logged into and read your plaintext password.
2. Inject scripts into the main (non-HTTPS) Pandora page and read it out of the DOM.
If they did go to the trouble of saving the password into local storage with encryption, one has to wonder what they were thinking, given that it's a lot of effort for a solution that's far less secure than the trivial effort of just storing hashed passwords.
2) I think there is a very real risk there, but of course, unless they use HSTS (and therefore always HTTPS) everywhere, there is a risk of this. Even if they use HSTS (which isn't broadly supported in browsers yet), almost no-one checks TLS certificates for man-in-the-middle attacks. In short: the man-in-the-middle attack risk is always a risk unless the user takes extraordinary efforts. They could do more to mitigate it, but it'd undoubtedly have some seriously negative user experience consequences. It seems like a very high bar to hold Pandora to given the nature of their service. If you are going to hold them to that standard, you might want to start with a more significant target like say.... the Apple Store.
Re #2: Again, it's a difference of degree. Invalid TLS certs will at least give a browser warning that a user isn't used to seeing (in modern browsers), cluing them in that something might be up. Sure, some users might bypass it anyway, but there's at least some tip-off. Furthermore, there's no reason why the password needs to be in the DOM past the login page, which can easily be served over full HTTPS with no user experience impact. Yes, that can still fall prey to session hijacking if you don't use HTTPS for the rest of the site, but session hijacking doesn't give you passwords that you can use to go break into other sites.
#2: It needn't be an invalid TLS cert. It could be a valid TLS cert pointing to another domain. The browser provides no warning and you only notice it if the check the domain is different from the one you expect. Watch out for domains that are only different because they use a funky character that looks like the one you are expecting.
#2 - which is something that browser vendors are working to address (e.g. by displaying non-ascii characters in slightly different ways, e.g. punycode, and by blacklisting domains used for phishing, etc).
#2: Right. So there is a possibility that some day in the future, if you are really careful and check your TLS certificate every time you do something with your password, Pandora will be exposing you to a huge gaping hole, that you would otherwise only be exposed to if you used the Apple Store, Amazon, Ebay....
#2: Answer: this many times.
So anyway, everyone change your Pandora password and be done with it. You can't buy anything with a Pandora account except to be able to listen to Pandora. That is not worth stealing, even if it is a great service. I pay for it, and I'm not going to stop because of Apple. They may have the library, but they don't have the years of experience that Pandora has in its market. I do think Apple will own the high-end home entertainment market eventually.
If they used an HMAC and the secret is stored locally, aside some some sort of JavaScript/browser exploit, it's more secure than a non-MAC cryptographically hashed password, and much more secure than the plaintext password you submit in your browser to log into almost every website in the entire world.
This Pandora password is just visible to you on your computer. If you're worried about that, please don't have a heart attack, but they have these things called malware now ...
For users that use the same few passwords everywhere, it could well be a problem.
All this shit started because someone who does not understand security thought it was horrible that a local program might store a password locally in plain text. There are a billion local programs that store passwords in a reversible way. Know why? Because sending a non-mac password is the same if it's hashed or not.
Blame whoever you want to blame, I don't care. But don't tell me Pandora is responsible for the total security of every moron on the internet, either.
Real security needs to work, even without the education and cooperation of "every moron on the internet" or it isn't going to work. Implementing systems that don't work in the face of this is just failing, then pointing fingers.
Malorie goes to the coffee shop/train station/airport terminal and sets up a public wifi network. The network--be it provided by a laptop hotspot or a router with custom software--is programmed to intercept request/response cycles as follows.
Every response, except those that are part of Malorie's attack, is replaced with a redirect to Pandora's settings page. Some fraction of users will have a Pandora login cookie, which means they'll see the page.
Further, every response for the Pandora settings page gets a <script> tag of Malorie's creation. The JS reads the value attributes of the password and email fields and sends them to Malorie's server.
Malorie then has a bunch of email/password combos. A lot of users will have reused that same combination on many different sites. Quite possibly their email accounts too, which would facilitate even more account takeovers via password reset emails.
So now Malorie can steal entire online identities. From people who reuse passwords, anyway.
To protect against this and many other attacks, everyone should avoid reusing passwords. A password manager, such as the excellent 1 Password, is the most practical solution.
Unless, of course, they use this local data for actual security purposes. In which case this is a huge gaping security hole and I wouldn't trust them with a bit of my data.
I too would hate for anyone to know I have a Maroon 5 station.
[EDIT] I don't.
Okay, I just did a simple test of what happens when I change my Pandora password. There is a record of HTML local storage keyed on "jStorage" which appears to be a giant JSON blob. A specific attribute whose name appears to be a randomly generated (encrypted) is updated.
Assuming that is password, stored encrypted, the exposure here may not be what people think. It certainly would mean the password need not be stored at all on Pandora's server. They could just have an HMAC. The password value could be simple extracted from local storage. Has anyone checked to see if this is the case?
Follow up: Okay, I further confirmed that if I set the password back to a prior value, that field in jStorage flips back to the prior value. So, it looks like it is stored encrypted, locally on the system. I haven't traced through all the JavaScript, but it seems likely that the security issue here is different than perceived, and might even be non-existant.