2) I think there is a very real risk there, but of course, unless they use HSTS (and therefore always HTTPS) everywhere, there is a risk of this. Even if they use HSTS (which isn't broadly supported in browsers yet), almost no-one checks TLS certificates for man-in-the-middle attacks. In short: the man-in-the-middle attack risk is always a risk unless the user takes extraordinary efforts. They could do more to mitigate it, but it'd undoubtedly have some seriously negative user experience consequences. It seems like a very high bar to hold Pandora to given the nature of their service. If you are going to hold them to that standard, you might want to start with a more significant target like say.... the Apple Store.
Re #2: Again, it's a difference of degree. Invalid TLS certs will at least give a browser warning that a user isn't used to seeing (in modern browsers), cluing them in that something might be up. Sure, some users might bypass it anyway, but there's at least some tip-off. Furthermore, there's no reason why the password needs to be in the DOM past the login page, which can easily be served over full HTTPS with no user experience impact. Yes, that can still fall prey to session hijacking if you don't use HTTPS for the rest of the site, but session hijacking doesn't give you passwords that you can use to go break into other sites.
#2: It needn't be an invalid TLS cert. It could be a valid TLS cert pointing to another domain. The browser provides no warning and you only notice it if the check the domain is different from the one you expect. Watch out for domains that are only different because they use a funky character that looks like the one you are expecting.
#2 - which is something that browser vendors are working to address (e.g. by displaying non-ascii characters in slightly different ways, e.g. punycode, and by blacklisting domains used for phishing, etc).
#2: Right. So there is a possibility that some day in the future, if you are really careful and check your TLS certificate every time you do something with your password, Pandora will be exposing you to a huge gaping hole, that you would otherwise only be exposed to if you used the Apple Store, Amazon, Ebay....
#2: Answer: this many times.
So anyway, everyone change your Pandora password and be done with it. You can't buy anything with a Pandora account except to be able to listen to Pandora. That is not worth stealing, even if it is a great service. I pay for it, and I'm not going to stop because of Apple. They may have the library, but they don't have the years of experience that Pandora has in its market. I do think Apple will own the high-end home entertainment market eventually.
If they used an HMAC and the secret is stored locally, aside some some sort of JavaScript/browser exploit, it's more secure than a non-MAC cryptographically hashed password, and much more secure than the plaintext password you submit in your browser to log into almost every website in the entire world.
This Pandora password is just visible to you on your computer. If you're worried about that, please don't have a heart attack, but they have these things called malware now ...
For users that use the same few passwords everywhere, it could well be a problem.
All this shit started because someone who does not understand security thought it was horrible that a local program might store a password locally in plain text. There are a billion local programs that store passwords in a reversible way. Know why? Because sending a non-mac password is the same if it's hashed or not.
Blame whoever you want to blame, I don't care. But don't tell me Pandora is responsible for the total security of every moron on the internet, either.
Real security needs to work, even without the education and cooperation of "every moron on the internet" or it isn't going to work. Implementing systems that don't work in the face of this is just failing, then pointing fingers.
Malorie goes to the coffee shop/train station/airport terminal and sets up a public wifi network. The network--be it provided by a laptop hotspot or a router with custom software--is programmed to intercept request/response cycles as follows.
Every response, except those that are part of Malorie's attack, is replaced with a redirect to Pandora's settings page. Some fraction of users will have a Pandora login cookie, which means they'll see the page.
Further, every response for the Pandora settings page gets a <script> tag of Malorie's creation. The JS reads the value attributes of the password and email fields and sends them to Malorie's server.
Malorie then has a bunch of email/password combos. A lot of users will have reused that same combination on many different sites. Quite possibly their email accounts too, which would facilitate even more account takeovers via password reset emails.
So now Malorie can steal entire online identities. From people who reuse passwords, anyway.
To protect against this and many other attacks, everyone should avoid reusing passwords. A password manager, such as the excellent 1 Password, is the most practical solution.
The real, major issue here is the fact that passwords are loaded into an HTTP-served page and displayed back to the user. It doesn't matter how it happens behind the scenes - the fact that someone can do either of the following is still majorly problematic:
1. Walk up to a computer you're logged into and read your plaintext password.
2. Inject scripts into the main (non-HTTPS) Pandora page and read it out of the DOM.
If they did go to the trouble of saving the password into local storage with encryption, one has to wonder what they were thinking, given that it's a lot of effort for a solution that's far less secure than the trivial effort of just storing hashed passwords.