The irony is that all of these metadata leaks and correlation attacks etc were theoretical at the time these technologies were created and developed, unless you’re NSA level compute power, both human and silicon. Now, any script kid has enough info to try to build an array of SDRs to do the same thing, and no one will care when they do besides the feds who cry foul about their turf being stepped on by plebeians. The public will never care because their eyes will already have glazed over once you mention MAC addresses and SSIDs.
It doesn't particularly matter what hobbyists get up to. It matters what's available at scale on the mass market, what's widely deployed, what data is legally permissible to collect on a large scale, and what data is legal to sell.
Law enforcement can't subpoena that which does not exist. The best defense to these sorts of things is often to place legal limits on collection, retention, and sale.
Your take is both alarmist and defeatist.
Legal limits on national security agencies are not enforceable due to Five Eyes etc. Allied foreign spies do what American spies don’t. I’m just admitting the political reality of the situation. What you do with that information may be limited, but it’s not a failing on my part that this is the status quo.
You're not talking about what they're talking about. They're talking about limiting corporate data collection. If companies don't build this into routers, then 99% of routers won't be collecting this data, and foreign spies won't have any data to steal.
Laws are powerful enough to stop that.
> wiretaps
I said 99%, not 100%.
> any third party in range of the WiFi network can likely do the same thing passively
But they won't do it in bulk without a lot of motivation (like profit).
I guess if you’re truly concerned you shouldn’t have WiFi at home or a mobile phone. Too bad 5G signals have similar capabilities, but at least the signals don’t propagate as well.
That ... might or might not be an issue, but it's not _this_ issue, ie the one we were originally talking about here.
A targeted order to wiretap (or otherwise spy on) a specific person or entity is entirely different from widespread data collection, retention, and sale for whatever corporate purpose. With widespread collection the data is then sitting there in a data lake waiting to be subpoenaed by law enforcement at their leisure for any arbitrary reason they happen to think up potentially years in the future.
> they are going to be legally compelled to do them, so the network structure’s form follows that function
You can't be compelled to hand over that which you do not have. Neither can you be compelled to modify your product in a particular manner absent market wide legislation; see FBI v Apple if you doubt that.
I do see what you mean, but they are differences of degree, not kind. It could be considered a best practice to minimize PII etc, but even other groups don’t do any better. Signal still uses phone numbers.
> > they are going to be legally compelled to do them, so the network structure’s form follows that function
> You can't be compelled to hand over that which you do not have. Neither can you be compelled to modify your product in a particular manner absent market wide legislation; see FBI v Apple if you doubt that.
I agree. However, Apple is also confident enough in their legal team, reasoning, funding, and likely legal outcomes that they will flout NSLs in America, and yet they will cave to UK in that they disabled Apple’s Advanced Data Protection (in UK) which means that iCloud files aren’t really E2EE if the government can just say that you can’t do that anymore. Not your keys, not your files and the security and privacy of said effects thereof.