Ukraine has very strong interests, but they have in fact restrained themselves from doing things that will provoke a war involving NATO. The US government has put many restrictions on Ukraine that Ukraine has abided by.
MAD isn't "abstract", if by abstract you mean somehow unreal. It has kept the humanity from being destroyed for generations, and the US and Russia invest a lot in maintaining it.
The only person I see saying that is some random Internet commenter. I've always heard the opposite from professionals in the field, especially that any threat to capability is a threat to stability.
With almost every country in the world, the US has first strike capability - the US could wipe out the country in hours or less, and only a few countries have a second strike capability to deter the US.
That had long been true with NK, a very belligerent enemy. But in the last couple of decades NK added a small nuclear arsenal. It's not enough for a MAD relationship with the US, but they could threaten great harm to US allies South Korea and Japan - imagine nuking Seoul and Tokyo - and possibly land one on US territory. It wouldn't destroy the US, but losing San Francisco is a serious deterrent.
Did the addition of NK's nuclear arsenal stabilize the situation by creating more deterrent, or destabilize it by emboldening NK? It's complex:
One factor is that the US has sworn off use of nuclear weapons in conventional conflicts, even ones they are losing, and have strictly adhered to that policy, not even using small tactical nukes. The US has an even stronger motive - it establishes a global taboo against nuclear weapon use that nobody has violated yet. NK is very aware of it because US generals recommended using nuclear weapons in the Korean War and the president declined - that may seem like too close a call for NK, and don't assume that NK understands the US nearly as well as you do (if you are American); miscalculations like that are common on all sides in international relations.
So now that NK has nuclear weapons, does that make a conventional conflict into a nuclear one, destabillizing the situation? What if the US believes they need to use nuclear weapons to prevent NK from using them on Seoul or San Franciso?
On the other hand, NK's nukes may prevent a conventional war. NK saw what happened to Iraq - everyone did, and many realized that actual nuclear weapons were their only defense if the US was going to ignore international law and sovereignty and engage in 'regime change'.
Strategic bombers make little sense, that's why everyone (even russians) are pushing for ballistic missiles instead. Strategic bombers used by Russia manly for terror with stockpile of soviet missiles.
Where do people get these things? The B2 is awful for bombing low-tech insurgent forces - far too expensive to operate. Its whole purpose is defeating SAMs in particular and the best defenses in the world.
"By September 2024, three test aircraft were in service: one performing one or two flight tests per week, and the others involved in ground tests."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northrop_Grumman_B-21_Raider#F....
The US has only ~20 B-2s, to go with ~60 B-52s (originally built in the 1950s), and ~40 B-1Bs (~1980s tech). Only the B-2 could survive war with a peer, afaik; that was fine after the Cold War when there was no peer threat but now that China is a near-peer threat, the US needs many more bombers capable in a peer conflict and the B-2 production line was shut down decades ago (production was discontinued when the Cold War ended). They plan to build the B-21 in much larger numbers.
Also, the B-21 was built for conflict with China, where distances are much greater than in Europe.
It is very visible from the top, esp to aerial recon that use other signals in addition to radar signature
I responded to this comment: "Destroying their entire strategic aviation forces would not meaningfully impact MAD."
Given the economic/international stance of Russia for the past three decades and the maintenance level of their armed forces, their ability to execute a first-strike nuclear attack and succeeding is pretty low.
Neither of those two are obviously true, and so relying on the assumptions of MAD is dangerous.
I personally find it astounding that people still talk about MAD when even Reagan was scared into accepting it was flawed. You can see the big change in his foreign policy position before and after - from confrontation to negotiation. As much as I loathe most of Reagan's political views, in retrospect he's been proven a lot more astute at least in this specific area of foreign policy than basically everyone who still pushes MAD.
E.g.:
> "But the more experience I had with Soviet leaders and other heads of state who knew them, the more I began to realize that many Soviet officials feared us not only as adversaries but as potential aggressors who might hurl nuclear weapons at them in a first strike"
If you think the other side is crazy enough to consider a first strike, MAD goes out the door and it becomes rational to consider preempting them if you think you have any chance at all to reduce the damage. And the greater damage potential the other side has, the more imperative this becomes.
MAD has for very long struck me as a rationalisation of an emotional desire to have the more destructive weapon, rather than a rational argument for this reason - there are so many scenarios where it increases risk rather than reduces it.
You then have a choice to make, and to Reagans credit he chose to try to pull things back from the brink, recognising it was more dangerous to try to one-up the Soviet Union than to talk to them.
Though it seems to me it's likely far more rational in general to posture even less, and intentionally back down to a point where you have enough to make an attack on yourself cost sufficiently more than it is worth to still deter, but little enough that preempting you isn't a matter of preventing total destruction. As a bonus the less aggressive posturing would seem less likely to make the other side think you're preparing to strike first.
I'm just speculating what, if any, geopolitical ramifications arise from this. Sometimes consequences happen even when you're 'the good guy'. Life is often not like the stories and things sometimes end up terribly even when you do everything right.
Any US adversary must be building sleeper cells in the continental US armed with drones from walmart/bestbuy ready to drop a grenade that will burn big and expensive planes/submarines/aircraft carriers, possibly even rocket silos or other parts of critical infrastructure.
If I were Iran/NK, or China, that would be my top priority, so that I could retaliate if USA attacks first
If you want to try to impose some deeper strategic meaning onto this, a more plausible one would be the reverse: that the more "western powers" pull back from supporting Ukraine, the more Ukraine is are forced to establish they are capable of less conventional, less predictable, more aggressive means of deterrence to compensate for the absence of strong western partners.