The worst possible interpretation is straightforward - they are working for the Russians as agents and let the Russians in or installed the keyloggers for Russia.
Or it could be state sponsored and they didn’t think they needed to be covert as they could walk through the front door on invitation of the executive branch.
I struggle to see what Russia would gain with nlrb data, but getting caught “helping doge” furthers distrust between the two sides of our country - which is something they gain from
>furthers distrust between the two sides of our country - which is something they gain from
How?
Yeah Trump winning seems to help them in Ukraine but their need is disruption as much as different policy in the longer term.
This story will percolate up to many democrats who will be furious that Russia is “helping” “doge”.
Separately, it won’t (or will be dismissed as “overreacting” or “lying”) by republicans. They will see the democrats as overreacting and having trump derangement syndrome.
Meanwhile, the next doge encounter with an agency now brings greater fear of illicit acts for internal IT people and more controls for doge to demand are turned off creating more conflict within government function.
The sides believe in the evil and stupidity of the other will be further ossified. Meanwhile, Russia is effectively able to do espionage in a way where getting caught doesn’t diminish the value of the espionage work they are engaged in.
A list of whistleblowers at American companies who presumably don't want said companies to know the details of their work.
The objective may not have been to obtain access or any useful data. The objective may have been to get the scary headlines about Russians and use the existing media and political agitprop to further destabilize the government you seek to color revolution away.
I'm not saying they didn't do that, just that it's not in line with their support for Putin and Russia. Maybe as a false flag it give Putin the cover to crack down on hacking groups that don't throat him.
Why does it increase support for AI in government?
Though with nation state actors you can't rule out Pegasus like zero-click infiltrations.
If they're trying to exfiltrate data, they might want to rotate through IP addresses in order to obfuscate what's going on or otherwise circumvent restrictions. Using a simple ip rotator like the post talks about would maybe be an approach they'd use. If they're not careful with the IP addresses, once in a while one might get caught due to some restriction like being outside the US. It'd maybe appear as though you're getting these weird requests from Russia, but that's just because you're not logging the requests that are not being flagged from the US.
Maybe I'm reading the post incorrectly though (if so, please correct me!)
Excerpt: "How much more proof do we need that this administration is completely compromised? There is zero reason for the US to relax any offensive digital actions against Russia. If anything, we should be applying more."
They were accessing the Github over the internet from superuser accounts they were presumably also just using as their default account. Given the code quality, I doubt their opsec is put together, either.
The alleged "Russian login attempts" were blocked by CAPs.
Russian state-sponsored actors have showned in the past that they use residential relay boxes to get around that.
If you read between the lines of the whistleblower claims, a lot of stuff doesn't add up. I especially like the conclusion that a deathnote was left on his door BEFORE he blew the whistle, and that a drone was hovering over his house.
* He could’ve gotten a death note because they suspected he might become a whistleblower, or simply because of what he knew. * This death note could have been the final straw. * Drones fly over my house all the time. If I witnessed what he did and received a death note, I may assign additional significance to it.
None of this is implausible at all.
Best possible case I see would be that the whistleblower has made some mistake (or is being intentionally dishonest). Seems plausible for instance that "it appeared they had the correct username and password" based on "our no-out-of-country logins policy activating" could just be a misunderstanding of how/when the policy triggers. Not to say it's the most likely explanation, just the least concerning one.
I think less concerning than keyloggers, while still assuming the whistleblower is correct, would be that a DOGE employee was using a VPN/proxy/Tor. Probably not a great idea to have traffic going through a hostile nation state even with encryption, but less bad than keyloggers on their machines stealing and trying credentials within minutes.
Definitely concerning though, to be clear - just steelmanning/answering the question of best possible interpretation.
This is the evidence which strongly suggests that the DOGE personnel are using various cloud IP addresses to scrape.
Why would they attempt a login from Russia (if it was indeed Russians)?
It is incredibly cheap to use a VPN with a US residential IP.
Many non technical people use VPNs to access region restricted content. It is trivial to understand and use.
Assuming this all actually happened as described, it sounds like someone wanted it to appear that these attempts were coming from Russia.
It's not behavior that makes any sense assuming even a semi-rational/intelligent actor.
It has details of labor disputes. Which if you’re Russia who thrives on fostering conflict in the US would be an ideal data set.
> Why would DOGE be immediately leaking just-granted NLRB login credentials to Russian assets
Because they are young, highly inexperienced engineers who have been tasked with rolling out their LLM system as quickly as possible. Their priority is not security.
Furthermore, that the NLRB data would somehow be of sufficient value to Russian state actors to justify risking burning their access to DOGE employees/data/credentials through frankly idiotic OPSEC, despite there being much higher value targets than the NLRB?
This even remotely doesn't pass the smell test.
b) This system: https://www.wired.com/story/doge-is-just-getting-warmed-up-d...
c) DOGE under its current form will end in the next weeks/months as Musk moves on. So if you’re Russia the best bet is to get as much data now as you can.
As claimed by a singular whistleblower. The NLRB itself says that they investigated his claims and found no evidence to support them.
> b) This system: https://www.wired.com/story/doge-is-just-getting-warmed-up-d...
You're asserting that's what they were doing with NLRB data, and not just that, but that doing so somehow exposed credentials to Russian actors? Based on what?
> c) DOGE under its current form will end in the next weeks/months as Musk moves on. So if you’re Russia the best bet is to get as much data now as you can.
If time is of the essence, doesn't it make sense to be more careful to not burn your access through ridiculously poor opsec?
Explains this:
> why would DOGE be immediately leaking just-granted NLRB login credential
The implication is that the credentials were for more than this specific system. It's entirely feasible that a bad actor would immediately try to vacuum up as much data from as many systems as possible, it's just that this system had a geo block that made it clear this was happening.
I don't think we need to assume that this was a targeted attack on this specific NLRB system, just that this specific NLRB system was the one that caught the attempts.
So, what systems DIDN'T block authentication?
[1] https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/conditional...
This context enables two important things:
- Granular exceptions: If Alice is attending a conference in Toronto, you can say "Allow Alice to log in from Canada next week" without opening Canada-wide logins for everyone. Pre-auth geo-blocking forces you into an all-or-nothing stance.
- Better threat intelligence: A valid login from an unexpected region (e.g. Moscow when Alice is normally in D.C.) is a far stronger signal of compromise than a failed attempt. Capturing "successful login + wrong location" helps you prioritize real threats. If you block pre-auth, you'd never know Alice's account was compromised.
Putting geo-checks after authentication gives you precise control over whom, exactly, is logging in from where, and offers richer data for your security monitoring.
Probably the least expected location to connect from, if it was genuine. Not saying it necessarily isn't, but it's not usual either and doesn't make much sense.
" On or about March 11, 2025, NxGen metrics indicated abnormal usage at points the prior week. I saw way above baseline response times, and resource utilization showed increased network output above anywhere it had been historically – as far back as I could look. I noted that this lined up closely with the data out event. I also notice increased logins blocked by access policy due to those log-ins being out of the country. For example: In the days after DOGE accessed NLRB’s systems, we noticed a user with an IP address in Primorskiy Krai, Russia started trying to log in. Those attempts were blocked, but they were especially alarming. Whoever was attempting to log in was using one of the newly created accounts that were used in the other DOGE related activities and it appeared they had the correct username and password due to the authentication flow only stopping them due to our no-out-of-country logins policy activating. There were more than 20 such attempts, and what is particularly concerning is that many of these login attempts occurred within 15 minutes of the accounts being created by DOGE engineers. "