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Re:DOGE Worker’s Code Supports NLRB Whistleblower by frumplestlatz on Wednesday April 23, 2025 @09:18PM (#43778423)
Occam’s razor would also suggest a hoax as one of several very credible possibilities.
Re:DOGE Worker’s Code Supports NLRB Whistleblower by threeseed on Wednesday April 23, 2025 @09:34PM (#43778492)
Occam's razor would suggest someone from Russia could just use their own IP because people like you would think it's a hoax anyway.
Re:DOGE Worker’s Code Supports NLRB Whistleblower by frumplestlatz on Wednesday April 23, 2025 @09:42PM (#43778526)
Why does someone from Russia want access to NLRB data, and why would DOGE be immediately leaking just-granted NLRB login credentials to Russian assets when it would be trivially traceable back to them, and if they were in fact granted untraceable/unlogged admin credentials, could legitimately download the data themselves and simply hand it over to said Russian assets if that was their actual intention?

It's not behavior that makes any sense assuming even a semi-rational/intelligent actor.

Re:DOGE Worker’s Code Supports NLRB Whistleblower by threeseed on Wednesday April 23, 2025 @10:48PM (#43778837)
> Why does someone from Russia want access to NLRB data

It has details of labor disputes. Which if you’re Russia who thrives on fostering conflict in the US would be an ideal data set.

> Why would DOGE be immediately leaking just-granted NLRB login credentials to Russian assets

Because they are young, highly inexperienced engineers who have been tasked with rolling out their LLM system as quickly as possible. Their priority is not security.

Re:DOGE Worker’s Code Supports NLRB Whistleblower by frumplestlatz on Wednesday April 23, 2025 @11:06PM (#43778923)
Your argument is that they are so inexperienced and insufficiently monitored that they immediately leaked just-granted NLRB login credentials (how?) to Russia, while rolling out an LLM system (what system?), and the Russian assets that acquired those credentials were so inept that they risked their access — and had their logins rejected — by immediately attempting to use them directly from a Russian IP block?

Furthermore, that the NLRB data would somehow be of sufficient value to Russian state actors to justify risking burning their access to DOGE employees/data/credentials through frankly idiotic OPSEC, despite there being much higher value targets than the NLRB?

This even remotely doesn't pass the smell test.

Re:DOGE Worker’s Code Supports NLRB Whistleblower by threeseed on Wednesday April 23, 2025 @11:39PM (#43779059)
a) No one knows how Russia had the credentials but they did.

b) This system: https://www.wired.com/story/doge-is-just-getting-warmed-up-d...

c) DOGE under its current form will end in the next weeks/months as Musk moves on. So if you’re Russia the best bet is to get as much data now as you can.

Re:DOGE Worker’s Code Supports NLRB Whistleblower by frumplestlatz on Thursday April 24, 2025 @12:08AM (#43779171)
> a) No one knows how Russia had the credentials but they did.

As claimed by a singular whistleblower. The NLRB itself says that they investigated his claims and found no evidence to support them.

> b) This system: https://www.wired.com/story/doge-is-just-getting-warmed-up-d...

You're asserting that's what they were doing with NLRB data, and not just that, but that doing so somehow exposed credentials to Russian actors? Based on what?

> c) DOGE under its current form will end in the next weeks/months as Musk moves on. So if you’re Russia the best bet is to get as much data now as you can.

If time is of the essence, doesn't it make sense to be more careful to not burn your access through ridiculously poor opsec?

Re:DOGE Worker’s Code Supports NLRB Whistleblower by anang on Thursday April 24, 2025 @05:47AM (#43780841)
> Whoever was attempting to log in was using one of the newly created accounts that were used in the other DOGE related activities and it appeared they had the correct username and password due to the authentication flow only stopping them due to our no-out-of-country logins policy activating.

Explains this:

> why would DOGE be immediately leaking just-granted NLRB login credential

The implication is that the credentials were for more than this specific system. It's entirely feasible that a bad actor would immediately try to vacuum up as much data from as many systems as possible, it's just that this system had a geo block that made it clear this was happening.

I don't think we need to assume that this was a targeted attack on this specific NLRB system, just that this specific NLRB system was the one that caught the attempts.

So, what systems DIDN'T block authentication?