Re:Whistleblower: DOGE Siphoned NLRB Case Data
by ffsoftboiled on Tuesday April 22, 2025 @08:39AM
(#43761421)
If the intent is to collect foreign IPs attempting login - you could block it down the chain. Lots of intelligence reasons to do this.
Re:Whistleblower: DOGE Siphoned NLRB Case Data
by crtasm on Tuesday April 22, 2025 @09:15AM
(#43761737)
If you block outright an adversary has reason to try another IP. If you allow the attempt then show a standard "login failed" page they have less information to go on.
Re:Whistleblower: DOGE Siphoned NLRB Case Data
by kissiel on Tuesday April 22, 2025 @08:40AM
(#43761430)
maybe to detect that the valid credentials are leaked / used in the wilds?
Re:Whistleblower: DOGE Siphoned NLRB Case Data
by Cthulhu_ on Tuesday April 22, 2025 @09:08AM
(#43761654)
Exactly; a valid login attempt from abroad should trigger an immediate account lock and credentials reset for sensitive systems like this.
Re:Whistleblower: DOGE Siphoned NLRB Case Data
by filcuk on Tuesday April 22, 2025 @09:19AM
(#43761768)
Not necessarily. One could have a gov site allowing anyone to view it, but have stricter rules on a /login path, HTTP POST, auth header, or it could have been blocked by some compny-wide safety layer that manages this stuff semi-automatically.
But that's just a speculation.
Re:Whistleblower: DOGE Siphoned NLRB Case Data
by mikeocool on Tuesday April 22, 2025 @09:15AM
(#43761730)
Auth providers (like Okta for example) often do the geo-blocking at level 7 -- because if you know the login being used, you can then lock the account that is being accessed from a blocked region.
Re:Whistleblower: DOGE Siphoned NLRB Case Data
by dagaci on Tuesday April 22, 2025 @09:24AM
(#43761833)
Remember these are elons are script kiddie hackers, it only occurred to disable the outer firewall, azure ad will independently geoip block all by itself
Re:Whistleblower: DOGE Siphoned NLRB Case Data
by ocdtrekkie on Tuesday April 22, 2025 @09:16AM
(#43761742)
So the default behavior of a Fortigate is to allow you to apply an access policy to the VPN tunnel itself, which can easily be a geoblock, but the local-in policy where the remote is actually authenticating against the firewall is much harder to change.
Not saying this is a Fortigate or that the federal government didn't change the low effort configuration, but it's certainly not unusual, Fortinet is a huge presence.
If you're blocking non-US IPs, you trpically block at the IP layer, before a login attempt can even begin.
Why allow someone to even log in at all?