I see this as maybe it’s not a statistical parrot, but it’s still only some kind of parrot, Maybe a sleep deprived one.
Do you mean in the sense than an LLM can emit documents following grammar rules or pirate-talk?
For humans, text doesn't generate our models so much as as it triggers them.
Language is a lot more than parsing syntax, whatever your thoughts are on the matter, even LLMs are clearly doing more than that. Are there any experiments where subjects had severe cognitive deficiencies and language in its full breadth or maybe i should say communication ? came out unscathed ?
The chris experiments don't seem to go into much detail in that front.
> That doesn't contradict the argument that “thinking” and “language processing” are not two sequential or clearly separated modes in the brain but deeply intertwined.
It's not an argument, it's an assertion, that is, in fact, contradicted by the experimental evidence I described (Moro and "Chris"). Of course they are "deeply intertwined" but because of the evidence it's probably an interface between two distinctive systems rather than one general system doing two tasks.
There's no contradiction because i never argued/asserted the brain didn't have parts tuned for language, which is really all this experiment demonstrates.
> There's no contradiction because i never argued/asserted the brain didn't have centers tuned for language, which is really all this experiment demonstrates.
I don't know what you are trying to say then.
I don't see how you can say his language ability is much higher than his general problem solving ability if you don't know what proficiency of language he is capable of reaching.
When you are learning say English as a second language, there are proficiency tiers you get assigned when you get tested - A1, A2 etc
If he's learning all these languages but maxing out at A2 then his language ability is only slightly better than his general problem solving ability.
This is the point i'm trying to drive home. Maybe it's because i've been learning a second language for a couple years and so i see it more clearly but saying 'he learned x language' says absolutely nothing. People say that to mean anything from 'well he can ask for the toilet' to 'could be mistaken for a native'.
>I don't know what you are trying to say then.
The brain has over millions of years been tuned to speak languages with certain structures. Deviating from these structures is more taxing for the brain. True statement. But how on earth does that imply the brain isn't 'thinking' for the structures it is used to ? Do you say you did not think for question 1 just because question 2 was more difficult ?
I believe the same, and also I'm willing to accept that the human brain can intentionally operate in an stochastic parrot mode.
Some people have the ability to fluently speak non-stop, completely impromptu. I wonder if it's similar to an LLM pipeline, where there'a constant stream of thoughts being generated based on very recent context, which are then passed through various output filters.
For example, in difficult perceptual tasks ("can you taste which of these three biscuits is different" [one biscuit is made with slightly less sugar]), a correlation of 0.3 is commonplace and considered an appropriate amount of annotator agreement to make decisions.
Not here though, where you are trying to prove a (near) equivalence.
We have a closed system that we designed to operate in a way that is similar to our limited understanding of how a portion of the brain works, based on how we would model that part of the brain if it had to traverse an nth-dimensional array. We have loosely observed it working in a way that could roughly be defined as similar to our limited understanding of how a portion of the brain works given that limitation that we know is not true of the human brain, with a fairly low confidence level.
Even if you put an extreme level of faith into those very subpar conclusions and take them to be rigid... That does not make it actually similar to the human brain, or any kind of brain at all.
(My utterly uninformed knee-jerk reaction here, but even if I was a true believer I don't think I'd reach for "compelling".)
if you add random rolls, you get a gaussian, thanks central limit theorem.
if you sum them, you get a lognormal distribution, which approximates a power law up to a cutoff
Going a bit further, I'll speculate that the actions made by a human brain are simply a function of the "input" from our ~5 senses combined with our memory (obviously there are complications such as spinal reflexes, but I don't think those affect my main point). Neural nets are universal function approximators, so can't a sufficiently large neural net approximate a full human brain? In that case, is there any merit to saying that a human "understands" something in a way that a neural net doesn't? There's obviously a huge gap between the two right now, but I don't see any fundamental difference besides "consciousness" which is not well defined to begin with.
I philosophically reject the notion that consciousness is an important factor here. The question of whether or not you have a consciousness doesn't affect what I take away from this conversation, and similarly the question of whether an AI has a consciousness doesn't affect what I take away from my actions with it. If the (non-)existence of others' consciousnesses doesn't materially affect my life—and we assume that it's a fundamentally unanswerable question—why should I care other than curiosity?
That doesn't remotely follow from the UAT and is also almost certainly false.
What is your basis for this? Do you have any evidence or expertise in neuroscience to be able to make this claim?
> Neural nets are universal function approximators, so can't a sufficiently large neural net approximate a full human brain?
We do not understand the brain well enough to make this claim.
> but I don't see any fundamental difference besides "consciousness" which is not well defined to begin with.
Yeah besides the gaping hole in our current understanding of neuroscience, you have some good points I guess.
More evidence against "stochastic parrots"
- zero shot translation, where LLMs can translate between unseen pairs of languages
- repeated sampling of responses from the same prompt - which shows diversity of expression with convergence of semantics
- reasoning models - solving problems
But my main critique is that they are better seen as pianos, not parrots. Pianos don't make music, but we do. And we play the LLMs on the keyboard like regular pianos.
* A linear transformation of a speech encoder's embeddings closely aligns them with patterns of neural activity in the brain's speech areas in response to the same speech sample.
* A linear transformation of a language decoder's embeddings closely aligns them with patterns of neural activity in the brain's language areas in response to the same language sample.