everything gets messy as soon as you start improving the land, because the improvements are not easily removed from the land. if the state owns the land but i own the skyscraper i built on it, what happens to my skyscraper when the state auctions my lease off to somebody else? the whole point of a land value tax is that the value of land changes after things have been built on it (and around it), and you need to capture that change in value.
TL;DR the lender loses money iff the value of the building is less than the money they loaned to build it (true in any system).
> whats to stop someone from taking out a huge loan and paying their own construction company to do the work at a premium?
That's called embezzling. Are you familiar with corporate law? The "limited liability" in "limited liability company" refers to the fact that the owners of a company are not liable for the debts owed by said company. One can, in principal, take out a large loan on behalf of a company you own, pay it to yourself as salary, then declare the company insolvent and pocket the cash. Laws exists to prevent this and could be extended to fraud under the new system.
This just is not necessarily true, and more importantly runs into the issue that now lenders will not lend to people and land that they believe cannot be be positively valued for the entire term of the debt. In real life if you buy a home on a 30 year mortgage, the lender does not need to care much if it could be less valuable in 20 years, only that it retains enough value to be worth the rest of the loan if it needs to be seized.
As for embezzlement, go try to get a loan as a new LLC without assets, or revenue, or personal collateral. The reality is that under your proposed system, no bank would ever take the risk of loaning money to a plot of land. Forget fraud and embezzlement, there's zero mechanism for preventing flat out bad management from ruining a plot over and over again if you don't attach debts to people.
i don't know that i'm even necessarily against this idea, but it's a long ways from just being a land value tax at this point.
Edit: I should add that the simplest way to handle this is to attach the debt used for building to the land instead of the land-owner. That way there is no loss for auctioning off the land after building.
You wouldn't pay. The building would be financed by debt and the debt would be attached to the land. You'd only pay the interest on that debt for as long as you maintain the lease on the land.
> Why wouldn't this world's Blackrock swoop in the instant a profitable lease comes up for auction?
Two reasons: Firstly, Blackrock could hypothetically do this in real life but they don't because they don't have the money. And secondly, from an ideological perspective they would have no motivation to. You are still thinking in terms of "owning land" and the idea that it's better to own more land. Under the new system, you can't own land, only rent it. Hence you want to minimise the amount of land you are leasing. If Blackrock gets the lease, they will lose money on the down payment, then lose money on the rent unless they can find something productive to do with the land. Any business they set up won't be competitive as they'll be paying more in rent than the surrounding businesses. Overpaying on rent is a strictly money-losing affair.
Let me outline this simple hypothetical
I lease a plot of land with a parking lot on it. I spend a year of my time building a quadplex on it, financed by a loan, and get tenants in. After all my expenses, I am making 10k a month in profit! Next year rolls around, tell me what stops Blackrock from taking the lease by offering the value of the lease+9.5k per month and making their money in quantity? Down payment doesn't matter because they have so much more in assets than me that they can make use of a plot of land that generates less profit than I need to live on.
The LVT solution to this is valuing the unimproved land. I.e. if someone were to buldose the buildings and infrastructure actually on the land, how much would it cost to rent it.
This works fine on a lot-by-lot basis, we tend to know the value of land in cities. It starts falling when you buy a large amount of land. The value of land in Manhattan is very high obviously. Remove the empire state building and that plot is still worth a lot of money.
The value of that lot is the surrounding infrastructure - transport, power, proximity of people, etc.
If one company owned the entire island as a single lot though, the unimproved land would be very low. If two companies owned the land, the unimproved value suddenly balloons.
Often 99-year leases (e.g., Hong Kong to the UK).
In practice, the tenant can typically break the lease with minimal consequence as the landlord (the government) can generally find new tenants, and diversifies risk over many landholdings.
Lease durations are important here; if you're like England and have 99 year leases instead of freeholds or something, then that's great, it's basically ownership, but you get no unit pricing signal until the next 99 year renewal rolls around.
Practically speaking, from a Georgist perspective, ths isn't even useful because it doesn't convey anything about the unimproved value. What if you make improvements to the land, like build a house or something? Do you have to knock it down when you leave? Is the government the only entity that can build houses?
What do you do when Elon Musk decides he doesn't like you and outbids you on every parcel you try to get a lease on?
On turnover, it's interesting to note that real-estate mobility has fallen markedly in the United States in recent decades. Whereas ~20% of individuals moved in any given year from 1948 through the early 1970s, that figure has fallen to about 7% in the 2020s:
<https://paulkedrosky.com/americans-are-less-mobile-than-ever...>
That translates to a move every 5 years to roughly every 15 years, or three times the residency.
Ironically, among the factors contributing to this is being "stuck" by a mortgage, e.g., a house that's under water (more owed than the unit can be sold for), particularly in states without non-recourse ("walkaway") lending laws. This isn't the only factor, but it does contribute.
Removing private land ownership might well improve this situation.
What does he do when he runs out of money for the down payments? Rich people can already price people out of industries in our existing economic system.
> then that's great, it's basically ownership
The entire point is to get rid of ownership, but there is no need to renew the lease at all. Just increase it based on increases in surrounding leases. Then allow the value to be negotiated down through voluntary renewal.
> What if you make improvements to the land, like build a house or something? Do you have to knock it down when you leave? Is the government the only entity that can build houses?
You build the house with debt, the debt stays with the land. If you leave, then the person who comes in after you has to pay for the construction of the house.