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Re:Engineers Do Not Get to Make Startup Mistakes When They B... by hooverd on Thursday November 28, 2024 @10:53PM (#42270639)
It's all merkle trees under the hood. I feel like the crypto coin stuff has overshadowed the useful bits.
Re:Engineers Do Not Get to Make Startup Mistakes When They B... by trog on Friday November 29, 2024 @02:28AM (#42271701)
Is a Merkle tree needed or is good old basic double ledger accounting in a central database sufficient? If a key requirement is not a distributed ledger then it seems like a waste of time.
Re:Engineers Do Not Get to Make Startup Mistakes When They B... by Onavo on Friday November 29, 2024 @03:43AM (#42272201)
Merkle tree is to prevent tampering, not bad accounting practices
Re:Engineers Do Not Get to Make Startup Mistakes When They B... by nly on Friday November 29, 2024 @04:41AM (#42272592)
It only prevents tampering if the cost of generating hashes is extremely high.

Internally in your company you're not going to spend millions of $'s a year in GPU compute just to replace a database.

Re:Engineers Do Not Get to Make Startup Mistakes When They B... by xorcist on Friday November 29, 2024 @05:02AM (#42272710)
"Prevents tampering" lacks specificity. git is a blockchain that prevents tampering in some aspects, but you can still force push if you have that privilege. What is important is understand what the guarantees are.
Re:Engineers Do Not Get to Make Startup Mistakes When They B... by limit499karma on Friday November 29, 2024 @10:12AM (#42274392)
? If I use something like Blake3 (which is super fast and emits gobs of good bits) and encode a node with say 512 bits of the hash, you are claiming that somehow I am vulnerable to tampering because the hash function is fast? What is the probable number of attempts to forge a document D' that hashes to the very same hash? And if the document in structured per a standard format, you have even less degrees of freedom in forging a fake. So yes, a Merkel tree definitely can provide very strong guarantees against tampering.
Re:Engineers Do Not Get to Make Startup Mistakes When They B... by oconnor663 on Friday November 29, 2024 @12:38PM (#42275488)
Fwiw, increasing the BLAKE3 output size beyond 256 bits doesn't add security, because the internal "chaining values" are still 256 bits regardless of the final output length. But 256 bits of security should be enough for any practical purpose.
Re:Engineers Do Not Get to Make Startup Mistakes When They B... by limit499karma on Friday November 29, 2024 @02:19PM (#42276278)
Good to know. But does that also mean that e.g. splitting the full output to n 256 chunks would mean there is correlation between the chunks? (I always assumed one could grab any number of bits (from anywhere) in a cryptographic hash.)
Re:Engineers Do Not Get to Make Startup Mistakes When They B... by oconnor663 on Saturday November 30, 2024 @01:18AM (#42279945)
You can take as many bytes from the output stream as you want, and they should all be indistinguishable from random to someone who can't guess the input. (Similar to how each of the bytes of a SHA-256 hash should appear independently random. I don't think that's a formal design goal in the SHA-2 spec, but in practice we'd be very surprised and worried if that property didn't hold.) But for example in the catastrophic case where someone found a collision in the default 256-bit BLAKE3 output, they would probably be able to construct colliding outputs of unlimited length with little additional effort.
Re:Engineers Do Not Get to Make Startup Mistakes When They B... by benlivengood on Saturday November 30, 2024 @01:43PM (#42283223)
Certificate transparency logs achieve tamper-resistance without expensive hashes.
Re:Engineers Do Not Get to Make Startup Mistakes When They B... by agentultra on Friday November 29, 2024 @01:31PM (#42275899)
Write-Once, Read Many drives also prevent tampering. Not everything needs crypto.
Re:Engineers Do Not Get to Make Startup Mistakes When They B... by chaboud on Friday November 29, 2024 @04:35PM (#42277306)
In a distributed setting where a me may wish to join the party late and receive a non-forged copy, it’s important. The crypto is there to stand in for an authority.
Re:Engineers Do Not Get to Make Startup Mistakes When They B... by trog on Friday November 29, 2024 @11:21PM (#42279395)
> In a distributed setting where a me may wish to join the party late and receive a non-forged copy, it’s important. The crypto is there to stand in for an authority.

Yeh, but that's kinda my point: if your primary use case is not "needs to be distributed" then there's almost never a benefit, because there is always a trusted authority and the benefits of centralisation outweigh (massively, IMO) any benefit you get from a blockchain approach.

Re:Engineers Do Not Get to Make Startup Mistakes When They B... by chaboud on Sunday December 01, 2024 @03:36PM (#42290566)
100% agreed there. A central authority can just sign stuff. Merkle trees can still be very valuable for integrity and synchronization management, but burning a bunch of energy to bogo-search nonces is silly if the writer (or federated writers) can be cryptographic authorities.
Re:Engineers Do Not Get to Make Startup Mistakes When They B... by jchanimal on Friday November 29, 2024 @07:57AM (#42273534)
We launched Fireproof earlier this month on HN. It’s a tamperproof Merkle CRDT in TypeScript, with an object storage backend for portability.

See our Show HN: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=42184362

We’ve seen interest from trading groups for edge collaboration, so multi-user apps can run on-site without cloud latency.

Re:Engineers Do Not Get to Make Startup Mistakes When They B... by nearting on Friday November 29, 2024 @10:08AM (#42274364)
This doesn't address the question in any way except to note that you also use Merkle Trees. Do you reply to any comment mentioning TypeScript with a link to your Show HN post as well?
Re:Engineers Do Not Get to Make Startup Mistakes When They B... by hluska on Friday November 29, 2024 @10:36AM (#42274539)
What disrespectful marketing. We don’t care that you use Merkle trees because that’s irrelevant. I guess I can add Fireproof to my big list of sketchy products to avoid. It’s embarrassing.
Re:Engineers Do Not Get to Make Startup Mistakes When They B... by jchanimal on Friday November 29, 2024 @10:43AM (#42274596)
I figured the responses would be more interesting. Questions about CRDT guarantees etc.

Perhaps worth seeding the convo with a remark about finality.

Re:Engineers Do Not Get to Make Startup Mistakes When They B... by hluska on Friday November 29, 2024 @02:17PM (#42276264)
While your intentions may have been around discussion, I don’t want to be marketed to when I’m trying to understand something unrelated. I have a business degree so I intimately understand that HN is technically free and it’s nice to get free eyeballs, but we are people too. I’m so much more than a credit card number, yet you’ve reduced me to a user acquisition in the most insulting way possible.

Perhaps instead of your ideas, it’s worth seeding your own personal make up with a firm statement of ethics??

Are you the kind of person who will hijack conversations to promote your product? Or do you have integrity?

Just purely out of concern for your business, do you have a cofounder who could handle marketing for you? If so, consider letting her have complete control over that function. It’s genuinely sad to see a founder squander goodwill on shitty marketing.

Re:Engineers Do Not Get to Make Startup Mistakes When They B... by jchanimal on Friday November 29, 2024 @02:30PM (#42276383)
In founder mode, I pretty much only think about these data structures. So I am (admittedly) not that sensitive to how it comes across.

Spam would be raising the topic on unrelated posts. This is a context where I can find people who get it. The biggest single thing we need now is critical feedback on the tech from folks who understand the area. You’re right I probably should have raised the questions about mergability and finality without referencing other discussions.

Because I don’t want to spam, I didn’t link externally, just to conversation on HN. As a reader I often follow links like this because I’m here to learn about new projects and where the people who make them think they’ll be useful.

ps I emailed the address in your profile, I have a feeling you are right about something here and I want to explore.

Re:Engineers Do Not Get to Make Startup Mistakes When They B... by wasabi991011 on Saturday November 30, 2024 @01:51PM (#42283263)
> Spam would be raising the topic on unrelated posts.

I think you need to reread the conversation, because you did post your marketing comment while ignoring the context, making your comment unrelated.

If you want it distilled down from my perspective, it went something like this:

> Trog: Doubts about the necessity of Merkle trees. Looking for a conversation about the pros and cons of Merkle trees and double ledger accounting.

> You: Look at our product. Incidentally it uses Merkle trees, but I am not going to mention anything about their use. No mention of pros and cons of Merkle trees. No mention of double ledger accounting.

Re:Engineers Do Not Get to Make Startup Mistakes When They B... by gr4vityWall on Sunday December 01, 2024 @01:51PM (#42289931)
Sorry, but your post came off as blatant advertising. There is no need to link to your company announcement just because it benefits you.
Re:Engineers Do Not Get to Make Startup Mistakes When They B... by jchanimal on Monday December 02, 2024 @04:10PM (#42300440)
Thanks y'all -- feedback taken. If I were saying it again I'd say something like:

Merkle proofs are rad b/c they build causal consistency into the protocol. But there are lots of ways to find agreement about the latest operation in distributed systems. I've built an engine using deterministic merge -- if anyone wants to help with lowest common ancestor algorithms it's all Apache/MIT.

While deterministic merge with an immutable storage medium is compelling, it doesn't solve the finality problem -- when is an offline peer too out-of-date to reconcile? This mirrors the transaction problem -- we all need to agree. This brings the question I'm curious about to the forefront: can a Merkle CRDT use a Calvin/Raft-like agreement protocol to provide strong finality guarantees and the ability to commit snapshots globally?

Apologies for the noise.

Re:Engineers Do Not Get to Make Startup Mistakes When They B... by csomar on Friday November 29, 2024 @06:19AM (#42273046)
Crypto/Blockchain makes it harder to have an incorrect state. If you fk up, you need to take down the whole operation and reverse everything back to the block in question. This ensures that everything was accounted for. On the other hand, if you fk in a traditional ledger system you might be tempted to keep things running and resolve "only" the affected accounts.
Re:Engineers Do Not Get to Make Startup Mistakes When They B... by delfinom on Friday November 29, 2024 @07:12AM (#42273285)
It's a question of business case. While ensuring you are always accounted correctly seems like a plus, if errors happen too often potentially due to volume, it makes more business sense sometimes to handle it while running rather than costing the business millions per minute having a pause.
Re:Engineers Do Not Get to Make Startup Mistakes When They B... by necovek on Friday November 29, 2024 @08:37AM (#42273760)
It's mostly a different approach to "editing" a transaction.

With a blockchain, you simply go back, "fork", apply a fixed transaction, and replay all the rest. The difference is that you've got a ledger that's clearly a fork because of cryptographic signing.

With a traditional ledger, you fix the wrong transaction in place. You could also cryptographically sign them, and you could make those signatures depend on previous state, where you basically get two "blockchains".

Distributed trust mechanisms, usually used with crypto and blockchain, only matter when you want to keep the entire ledger public and decentralized (as in, allow untrusted parties to modify it).

Re:Engineers Do Not Get to Make Startup Mistakes When They B... by koolba on Friday November 29, 2024 @08:43AM (#42273799)
> With a traditional ledger, you fix the wrong transaction in place.

No you don’t. You reverse out the old transaction by posting journal lines for the negation. And in the same transactions you include the proper booking of the balance movements.

You never edit old transactions. It’s always the addition of new transactions so you can go back and see what was corrected.

Re:Engineers Do Not Get to Make Startup Mistakes When They B... by necovek on Saturday November 30, 2024 @09:10AM (#42281715)
Right, thanks for the correction: I wanted to highlight the need for "replaying" all the other transactions with a blockchain.
Re:Engineers Do Not Get to Make Startup Mistakes When They B... by olddustytrail on Saturday November 30, 2024 @11:33AM (#42282404)
In git terms, it's like `revert` Vs `rebase`.
Re:Engineers Do Not Get to Make Startup Mistakes When They B... by lelanthran on Friday November 29, 2024 @11:10PM (#42279335)
> With a traditional ledger, you fix the wrong transaction in place.

That's not how accounting works. You post a debit/credit note.

Re:Engineers Do Not Get to Make Startup Mistakes When They B... by solatic on Saturday November 30, 2024 @12:55AM (#42279860)
> With a blockchain, you simply go back, "fork", apply a fixed transaction, and replay all the rest.

You're handwaving away a LOT of complexity there. How are users supposed to trust that you only fixed the transaction at the point of fork, and didn't alter the other transactions in the replay?

Re:Engineers Do Not Get to Make Startup Mistakes When They B... by necovek on Saturday November 30, 2024 @09:17AM (#42281746)
My comment was made in a particular context. If you can go back, it's likely a centralized blockchain, and users are pretty much dependent on trusting you to run it fairly anyway.

With a proper distributed blockchain, forks survive only when there is enough trust between participating parties. And you avoid "editing" past transactions, bit instead add "corrective" transactions on top.