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Re:Engineers Do Not Get to Make Startup Mistakes When They B... by oconnor663 on Friday November 29, 2024 @12:38PM (#42275488)
Fwiw, increasing the BLAKE3 output size beyond 256 bits doesn't add security, because the internal "chaining values" are still 256 bits regardless of the final output length. But 256 bits of security should be enough for any practical purpose.
Re:Engineers Do Not Get to Make Startup Mistakes When They B... by limit499karma on Friday November 29, 2024 @02:19PM (#42276278)
Good to know. But does that also mean that e.g. splitting the full output to n 256 chunks would mean there is correlation between the chunks? (I always assumed one could grab any number of bits (from anywhere) in a cryptographic hash.)
Re:Engineers Do Not Get to Make Startup Mistakes When They B... by oconnor663 on Saturday November 30, 2024 @01:18AM (#42279945)
You can take as many bytes from the output stream as you want, and they should all be indistinguishable from random to someone who can't guess the input. (Similar to how each of the bytes of a SHA-256 hash should appear independently random. I don't think that's a formal design goal in the SHA-2 spec, but in practice we'd be very surprised and worried if that property didn't hold.) But for example in the catastrophic case where someone found a collision in the default 256-bit BLAKE3 output, they would probably be able to construct colliding outputs of unlimited length with little additional effort.