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Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by jmb99 on Sunday July 21, 2024 @12:07AM (#41022302)
> I find it hard to believe that they didn't test it before deployment.

I’m not sure why you find that hard to believe - based on the (admittedly fairly limited) evidence we have right now, it’s highly unlikely that this deployment was tested much, if at all. It seems much more likely to me that they were playing fast and loose with definition updates to meet some arbitrary SLAs[1] on zero-day prevention, and it finally caught up with them. Much more likely than somehow every single real-world pc running their software being affected but their test machines somehow all impervious.

[1] When my company was considering getting into endpoint security and network anomaly detection, we were required on multiple occasions by multiple potential clients to provide a 4-hour SLA on a wide number of CVE types and severities. That would mean 24/7 on-call security engineers and a sub-4-hour definition creation and deployment. Yes, that 4 hours was for the deployment being available on 100% of the targets. Good luck writing and deploying a high-quality definition for a zero day in 4 hours, let alone running it through a test pipeline, let alone writing new tests to actually cover it. We very quickly noped out of the space, because that was considered “normal” (at least to the potential clients we were discussing). It wouldn’t shock me if CS was working in roughly the same way here.

Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by drooopy on Sunday July 21, 2024 @01:39AM (#41022687)
This whole f*up was a failure of management and processes at Crowdstrike. "Intern Steve" pushing faulty code to production on a Friday is only a couple of cm of the tip of an enormous iceberg.
Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by chronid on Sunday July 21, 2024 @02:22AM (#41022885)
I wrote this in another thread already, but the fuck up was both at crowdstrike (they borked a release) but also and more importantly their customers. Shit happens even with the best testing in the world.

You do not deploy anything, ever on your entire production fleet at the same time and you do not buy software that does that. It's madness and we're not talking about small companies with tiny IT departments here.

Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by KaiserPro on Sunday July 21, 2024 @04:16AM (#41023408)
> You do not deploy anything, ever on your entire production fleet at the same time and you do not buy software that does that

I am sympathetic to that, but its only possible if both policy and staffing allow.

for policy, there are lots of places that demand CVEs be patched within x hours depending on severity. A lot of times, that policy comes from the payment integration systems provider/third party.

However you are also dependent on programs you install not autoupdating. Now, most have an option to flip that off, but its not always 100% effective.

Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by chronid on Sunday July 21, 2024 @05:27AM (#41023705)
> I am sympathetic to that, but its only possible if both policy and staffing allow.

We are not talking about small companies here. We're talking about massive billion revenue enterprises with enormous IT teams and in some cases multiple NOCs and SOCs and probably thousands consultants all around at minimum.

I find it hard to be sympathetic to this complete disregard of ownership just to ship responsibility somewhere else (because this is the need at the of the day let's not joke around). I can understand it, sure, and I can believe - to a point - someone did a risk calculation (possibility of crowdstrike upgrade killing all systems vs hack if we don't patch a CVE in <4h), but it's still madness from a reliability standpoint.

> for policy, there are lots of places that demand CVEs be patched within x hours depending on severity.

I'm pretty sure leadership when they need to choose between production being down for an unspecified amount of time and taking the risk of delaying (of hours in this case) the patching will choose the delay. Partners and payment integration providers can be reasoned with, contracts are not code. A BSOD you cannot talk away.

Sure, leadership is also now saying "but we were doing the same thing as everyone else, the consultants told us to and how could have we have known this random software with root on every machine we own could kill us?!" to cover their asses. The problem is solved already, since it impacted everyone, and they're not the ones spending their weekend hammering systems back to life.

> However you are also dependent on programs you install not autoupdating. Now, most have an option to flip that off, but its not always 100% effective.

You choose what to install on your systems, and you have the option to refuse to engage with companies that don't provide such options. If you don't, you accept the risk.

Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by d1sxeyes on Sunday July 21, 2024 @03:22AM (#41023179)
That’s a tricky one. CrowdStrike is cybersecurity. Wait until the first customer complains that they were hit by WannaCry v2 because CrowdStrike wanted to wait a few days after they updated a canary fleet.

The problem here is that this type of update (a content update) should never be able to cause this however badly it goes. In case the software receives a bad content update, it should fail back to the last known good content update (potentially with a warning fired off to CS, the user, or someone else about the failed update).

In principle, updates that could go wrong and cause this kind of issue should absolutely be deployed slowly, but per my understanding, that’s already the practice for non-content updates at CrowdStrike.

Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by chronid on Sunday July 21, 2024 @03:37AM (#41023237)
Windows updates are also cybersecurity, but the customer has (had?) a choice to how to roll those out (with Intune nowadays?). The customer should decide when to update, they own the fleet not the vendor!

You do not know if a content update will screw you over and mark all the files of your company as malware. The "It should never happen" situations are the thing you need to prepare for, the reason we talk about security as an onion, the reason we still do staggered production releases with baking times even after tests and QA have passed...

"But it's cybersecurity" is not a justification. I know that security departments and IT departments and companies in general love dropping the "responsibility" part on someone else, but in the end of the day the thing getting screwed over is the company fleet. You should retain control and make sure things work properly, the fact those billion dollar revenue companies are unable to do so is a joke. A terrible one, since IT underpins everything nowadays.

Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by chrisjj on Sunday July 21, 2024 @06:12AM (#41023919)
> The customer should decide when to update, they own the fleet not the vendor!

The CS customer has decided to update whenever 24/7 CS says. The alternative is to arrive on Monday morning to an infected fleet.

Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by chronid on Sunday July 21, 2024 @06:31AM (#41023998)
Sorry, this is untrue. Enterprises have SOCs and oncalls, if there is a high risk they can do at least minimal testing (which would have found this issue as it has a 100% bsod rate) and then fleet rollout. It would have been rolled out by Friday evening in this case without crashing hundred of thousands of servers.

The CS customer has decided to offload the responsibility of its fleet to CS. In my opinion that's bullshit and negligence (it doesn't mean I don't understand why they did it), particularly at the scale of some of the customers :)

Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by chrisjj on Sunday July 21, 2024 @09:38AM (#41025001)
> they can do at least minimal testing (which would have found this issue as it has a 100% bsod rate)

Incorrect, I believe, given they did not and could not get advance sight of the offending forced update.

Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by Kwpolska on Sunday July 21, 2024 @09:59AM (#41025155)
I doubt CrowdStrike had done any testing of the update.
Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by chrisjj on Sunday July 21, 2024 @09:40AM (#41025016)
> they can do at least minimal testing (which would have found this issue as it has a 100% bsod rate)

Incorrect, I believe, given they could and did not get advance sight of the offending forced update.

Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by d1sxeyes on Sunday July 21, 2024 @05:14PM (#41028187)
It is a justification, just not necessarily one you agree with.

Companies choose to work with Crowdstrike. One of the reasons they do that is ‘hands-off’ administration-let a trusted partner do it for you. There are absolutely risks of doing it this way. But there are also risks of doing it the other way.

The difference is, if you hand over to Crowdstrike, you’re not on your own if something goes wrong. If you manage it yourself, you’ve only got yourself working on the problem if something goes wrong.

Or worse, something goes wrong and your vendor says “yes, we knew about this issue and released the fix in the patch last Tuesday. Only 5% of your fleet took the patch? Oh. Sounds like your IT guys have got a lot of work on their hands to fix the remaining 95% then!”.

Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by wazzaps on Sunday July 21, 2024 @02:50AM (#41023042)
Apparently CrowdStrike bypassed clients' staging areas with this update.

Source: https://x.com/patrickwardle/status/1814367918425079934

Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by owl57 on Sunday July 21, 2024 @03:08AM (#41023117)
> you do not buy software that does that

Note how the incident disproportionally affected highly regulated industries, where businesses don't have a choice to screw "best practice".

Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by TeMPOraL on Sunday July 21, 2024 @03:52AM (#41023310)
Only highlighting that "best practice" of cybersecurity is, charitably, total bullshit; less charitably, a racket. This is apparent if you look at the costs to the day-to-day ability of employees to do work, but maybe it'll be more apparent now that people got killed because of it.
Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by badgersnake on Sunday July 21, 2024 @04:53AM (#41023544)
It’s absolutely a racket.
Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by stef25 on Sunday July 21, 2024 @03:25AM (#41023190)
You'd think that the software would sit in a kind of sandbox so that it couldn't nuke the whole device but only itself. It's crazy that this is possible.
Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by echoangle on Sunday July 21, 2024 @03:52AM (#41023311)
The software basically works as a kernel module as far as I understand, I don’t think there’s a good way to separate that from the OS while still allowing it to have the capabilities it needs to have to surveil all other processes.
Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by temac on Sunday July 21, 2024 @05:51AM (#41023823)
Something like ebpf.
Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by layer8 on Sunday July 21, 2024 @02:13PM (#41026922)
And even then, you wouldn’t want the system to continue running if the security software crashes. Such a crash might indicate a successful security breach.
Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by perbu on Sunday July 21, 2024 @02:32AM (#41022938)
Shit might happen with the best testing, but with decent testing it would not be this serious.
Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by sateesh on Sunday July 21, 2024 @04:47AM (#41023512)
Disagree with the part where you put onus on customer. As has been mentioned in other HN thread [1], this update was pushed ignoring whatever the settings customer had configured. The original mistake of the customer, if any, was they didn't read this in fine print of the contract (if this point about updates was explicitly mentioned in the contract). 1. https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=41003390
Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by chrisjj on Sunday July 21, 2024 @06:14AM (#41023928)
> You do not deploy anything, ever on your entire production fleet at the same time

And if an attacker does??

Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by jmb99 on Sunday July 21, 2024 @02:48AM (#41023031)
Oh absolutely. There’s many levels of failure here. A few that I see as being likely:

- Lack of testing of a deployment - Lack of required procedures to validate a deployment - Engineering management prioritizing release pace over stability/testing - Management prioritizing tech debt/pentests/etc far too low - Sales/etc promising fast turnarounds that can’t be feasibly met while following proper standards - Lack of top-down company culture of security and stability first, which should be a must for any security company

This outage wasn’t caused only by “the intern pushing release.” It was caused by a poor company culture (read: incorrect direction from the top) resulting in a lack of testing of the program code, lack of testing environment for deployments, lack of formal deployment process, and someone messing up a definition file that was caught by 0 other employees or automated systems.

Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by _moof on Sunday July 21, 2024 @02:04AM (#41022791)
I can't speak to its veracity but there's a screenshot making its way around in which Crowdstrike discouraged sites from testing due to the urgency of the update.
Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by jmb99 on Sunday July 21, 2024 @02:52AM (#41023052)
It’s kind of hard to pitch “zero-day prevention” if you suggest people roll out definitions slowly, over the course of days/weeks. Thus making it a lot harder to charge to the moon for your service.

Now, if these sorts of things were battle tested before release, and had a (ideally decade+-long) history of stability with well-documented processes to ensure that stability, you can more easily make the argument that it’s worth it. None of those things are close to true though (and more than likely will never be for any AV/endpoint solution), so it is very hard to justify this sort of configuration.

Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by AmericanChopper on Sunday July 21, 2024 @02:29AM (#41022925)
I don’t work with CS products atm, but my experience with a big CS deployment was exactly like this. They were openly quite hostile to any suggestion of testing their products, we were frequently rebuked for running our prod censors on version n-1. I talked about it a bit in this comment.

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=%2041002864

Very much not surprised to see this now.

Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by qaq on Sunday July 21, 2024 @02:20AM (#41022879)
While true agent should roll back to previous content version if it keeps crashing
Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by Kwpolska on Sunday July 21, 2024 @03:20AM (#41023170)
Detecting system crashes would be hard. You could try logging and comparing timestamps on agent startups and see if the difference is 5 minutes or less. Buggy kernel drivers crash Windows hard and fast.
Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by qaq on Sunday July 21, 2024 @04:28AM (#41023447)
loading content is pretty specific step so your solution is more or less valid
Re:Initial details about why CrowdStrike's CSAgent.sys crashed by kchr on Sunday July 21, 2024 @01:05PM (#41026417)
> Detecting system crashes would be hard.

Store something like an `attemptingUpdate` flag before updating, and remove it if the update was successful. Upon system startup, if the flag is present, revert to the previous config and mark the new config bad.