I agree that the 2017 charter hints at acceptance of 1967 borders, and that its formulation is ambiguous in this sense (my "unambiguous" comment was in the context of analyzing whether Hamas would want to be citizens of Israel -- I think their rejection of this idea is unambiguous).

I think your reading is consistent with what the document says. On its face, the document hints at accepting a two-state solution under the 1967 borders. The most charitable interpretation would be that Hamas is willing to consider a two state solution an ultimate settlement of the conflict, with the two states living side-by-side in peace and harmony indefinitely.

However, another possible interpretation is that Hamas is willing to accept 1967 borders in order to secure statehood, but after securing it (including lifting of the blockade, etc) it primarily intends to use its state as a base to attack Israel with more vigor and resources until Israel is destroyed. "As a practical matter" could easily be read as "as a short-term solution."

When I observe Hamas's behavior, the second interpretation seems far more likely to me. Even as the document was announced, they said "We shall not waive an inch of the Palestinian home soil, no matter what the recent pressures are and no matter how long the occupation." The formulation of the document seems designed to legitimize future attacks on Israel once the two states are established. And Hamas shows little interest in developing Gaza as a permanent home for any of its people, as you would expect if they truly see it as a core part of their future state, preferring instead to preserve refugee status for as many people as possible.

I think we're on the same basic page about Hamas. They could very well have ulterior motives, and could just be going along with a 2SS process in order to buy time for future offensive strategies.

My only point is that it's important to come to an objective view of what the language of the document says, on its own terms (even if we suspect it's all on the surface and their real intentions may be entirely different). And even if the language is only surface-level -- it at least opens a door to some kind of a pathway towards a solution based on negotiation and international law, without outside observers and verified inspections of their offensive capabilities, verified elections and national referenda at regular intervals, and so forth.

Which is the only viable route out of the current state of the conflict, in my view.

I appreciate your point of view. I'd be happy to see a "internationalist" future that involves a two-state solution along with verified inspections of militarization, UN governance of Jerusalem, etc.

Unfortunately I don't see a Palestinian state accepting international limitations on its offensive militarization. I imagine they would consider that an unacceptable limit on their sovereignty.

I also think the "right of return" is an unfortunate stumbling block that will prevent this kind of settlement. Palestinians want to turn the clock back to a time before their allies launched a war to destroy Israel, and a time before the Mizrahi were expelled from the Arab world. Practically speaking, it's asking Israel to accept an unspecified number of people who are likely to be hostile to its existence. It's hard to imagine how this doesn't lead to a sharp increase in the amount of terror attacks inside Israel.

I want to believe that you are right, and that recognizing/encouraging small steps towards agreement from both sides will ultimately lead to a lasting peace. But my fear is that it is just a ruse to gain advantage, and that accepting it at face value will lead the West to give concessions that will ultimately aid future wars that seek to destroy Israel.

Thanks; I appreciate yours as well. I certainly don't pretend to know all the answers here.

It's a little odd to see discussions of Hamas centering on the 2017 charter. That document was written by Khaled Mishal, who led the Hamas political wing (the "politburo", I guess?) from Doha. It was announced just as Mishal was forced from power by the hardline Gaza-based Al-Qassam wing of Hamas, which rejects that charter.

People go back and forth on how much evidence there is or isn't for Sinwar and Gaza-based Hamas's rejection of the 2017 charter, but read reporting and analysis from the time, untainted by what happened on October 7, about what the objectives were for updating the charter (significantly: easing Egypt's longstanding blocade of Gaza, repairing political relationships, working around Egypt's post-Arab-Spring, post-Sisi coup suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas's parent organization). Then look what happened on October 7. Like, there isn't much doubt that the 2017 document was unserious at this point?

This is purely a nerd point and not something I expect would change anybody's mind about what's happening in Gaza or what the outcomes should be.

Another way to read the situation:

The Charter was at the time meant seriously, at least by a certain faction within Hamas.

But with intervening events -- such as the appallingly harsh response to the 2018-2019 border protests; the storming of Al-Aqsa; and the election of the 37th Government (which brought on board not just an unsavory cast of characters, but specific plans for the continued expansion of the Settlements) -- the view took hold that Israeli society was plainly not interested in such overtures.

So as a result, the Charter got flagged and downvoted.

OK, but the reporting at the time of the charter was that Mishal had lost a power struggle with the hardliners --- these are events that occurred before the 2018 "protest". People wrote about the new charter when it happened! There's a bunch of analysis you can go read. You don't need to axiomatically derive this stuff, including the notion that the Al-Qassam wing rejected the 2017 charter.

Acknowledged that there were additional factors and events involved.

Since you prefer not to be centered on the Charter itself: if we are to understand why the decision was made to launch Operation Al-Aqsa Flood; an in particular how they were able to recruit so many people to agree to what was apparently promised as a suicide mission -- then I submit that is necessary to consider the whole background of events up until that time.

The 2018 "protest"

Can we just acknowledge the cruel and unduly harsh nature of the military response to the protests (which by all accounts did at least start peacefully, and from within sectors of society independent of Hamas) without having to allude to the Israeli government's snide, mocking ("fake protest") narrative of it?

As if these people have nothing to protest or be unhappy about.

I don't know where we go from "Gazans have nothing to protest or be unhappy about". I would disqualify from conversation immediately anybody, whether or not they supported Israel, who claimed Gazans don't have grave and legitimate grievances. Hamas, I contend, is one of them, but you can think otherwise.

We have reporting on the motivation behind the Al-Aqsa Flood. That reporting suggests:

* Sinwar and the Gazan hardliners siezed control of Hamas; political leadership of Hamas (on the "other side", the "Sinn Fein" types in the movement, if you want) allegedly were forced to flee.

* Sinwar held a conference more than a year ago to plan out the aftermath of the attack, in which he expected to gain complete control Israel's territory, and had worked out down the level of which exact Israeli Jewish professionals he would allow to leave versus which he would force to stay to help build up the Palestinian state --- some of that reporting is sourced from Hamas people in attendance who were freaked out because Sinwar had become a messianic lunatic. This reporting, as I remember it, actually precedes October 7.

* Apparently, Sinwar expected the October 7th attacks to immediately ignite solidarity attacks from the West Bank, unifying Gaza and the West Bank behind Hamas (this is, of course, one of the most salient conflicts in the region; they literally fought a "civil war" after the 2007 "elections").

* Further, it was apparently Sinwar's expectation that Iran would directly and forcefully back these attacks, committing Hezbollah to full scale northern front.

* Thus: the decision to launch the attacks on October 7 were based on a long-term belief that Hamas was poised to destroy the state of Israel outright.

I was aware of some of this chronology, but not as much as you are, apparently.

So if you'd care to pass along some of the sources you've been drawing from, I'd be happy to give them a close read.

The post above mine was perfectly reasonable; there's absolutely no reason it should have been flagged.

I am unable to vouch, so hopefully someone who is reading this will please do so.

It's not dead, so there's nothing to vouch. It's best to just proceed without reference to things like votes; they work themselves out over time.

Anyways: one such report, about the conference, is via MEMRI. MEMRI is itself not really all that trustworthy! I would steer away from any analytical results! But this piece is largely direct quotes. Maybe they're fabricating them. Seems a little unlikely, though?

https://www.memri.org/reports/hamas-sponsored-promise-hereaf...

Notably, a bunch of more mainstream sources corroborated this report (just Google for the name of the conference). I think it's very likely to be legitimate.

Yup, they're pretty freaky. But if their quotes pan out with other sources, they may be useful. Thanks for posting.