News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:A quick post on Chen's algorithm by faitswulff on Tuesday April 16, 2024 @06:24PM (#40058026)
It seems like the post-quantum algorithm that Signal selected [0] involves lattices [1] somehow:

> Kyber is an IND-CCA2-secure key encapsulation mechanism (KEM), whose security is based on the hardness of solving the learning-with-errors (LWE) problem over module lattices.

Curious to see if Chen's work will eventually lead to Signal selecting a different algorithm.

[0]: https://signal.org/blog/pqxdh/

[1]: https://pq-crystals.org/kyber/

Re:A quick post on Chen's algorithm by tptacek on Tuesday April 16, 2024 @08:46PM (#40059187)
More or less all of the "serious", actually deployed PQC schemes involve lattices, going back before the competition.
Re:A quick post on Chen's algorithm by contact9879 on Tuesday April 16, 2024 @09:06PM (#40059292)
I've seen some Classic McEliece deployments, too. Well, I know of only one: Mullvad.

https://github.com/mullvad/mullvadvpn-app/blob/main/talpid-t...

Re:A quick post on Chen's algorithm by tptacek on Tuesday April 16, 2024 @10:17PM (#40059722)
Some helpful, perhaps valid context is that lattice-based cryptography was a contender even before PQC became a thing (NTRU being the obvious example).

Really the only point I'm trying to make here is that there's nothing eyebrow-raising about systems using lattice crypto; after IFP/FFDLP stuff like RSA and ECDLP, lattices are maybe the next most mainstream approach to constructing asymmetric systems.

Re:A quick post on Chen's algorithm by pclmulqdq on Friday April 19, 2024 @12:09PM (#40088564)
I'm late to the party, but McEliece codes have also been around for a very long time, predating AES by a fair margin. The biggest problem with them is that the public keys are gigantic and the private keys are very large - even bigger than the keys used in lattice-based cryptosystems. This has caused them to always be a sort of fringe form of cryptography.

The good part is that McEliece codes are based on a proven NP-hard algorithm, so cracking them in polynomial time needs P = NP.

Re:A quick post on Chen's algorithm by contact9879 on Tuesday April 16, 2024 @07:22PM (#40058574)
Green explicitly mentions Kyber in his post.

> NIST-approved schemes based on lattice problems include Kyber and Dilithium (which I wrote about recently.)

> Chen’s algorithm does not immediately apply to the recently-standardized NIST algorithms such as Kyber or Dilithium.

And it's not just Signal. Apples new iMessage protocol, PQ3, uses Kyber, too. [1] Most deployments of PQ-crypto that I know of have used Kyber.

[1] https://security.apple.com/blog/imessage-pq3/

Re:A quick post on Chen's algorithm by glitchc on Tuesday April 16, 2024 @08:02PM (#40058888)
Kyber is the fastest KEM after Rainbow. Once Rainbow was broken, Kyber was the obvious choice. NIST delayed as long as it did to perform due diligence.
Re:A quick post on Chen's algorithm by jameswryan on Tuesday April 16, 2024 @08:20PM (#40059011)
Rainbow is not a KEM, but a signature scheme.
Re:A quick post on Chen's algorithm by candiddevmike on Tuesday April 16, 2024 @08:15PM (#40058977)
Signal will always be selecting different algorithms by virtue of being a security focused privacy tool. The past 5-7 years have been kind of an anomaly for cryptography where the industry collectively decided EC and friends were "good enough". PQC has brought back the algorithm churn crypto folks love/hate.