Re:Working with Qubes OS at the Guardian
by fsflover on Saturday April 06, 2024 @10:43AM
(#39952857)
How do you suggest to prevent badUSB attack with air-gapping?
[ Parent
| on HN ]
By prohibiting the carriage of USB media or only allowing ones which are under strict and constant supervision and lockdown, not to mention locking down any USB ports on the computer itself both physically and in software.
An air gap means there are physical barriers that are locked down (you are installing physical barriers and locking them down, right?), which means you can inspect anyone and anything trying to traverse it and prohibit anyone and anything that is even remotely suspect.
The fact you are even asking this demonstrates you (by far the most vocal of the "Qubes is enough" crowd here) don't understand air gapping.
Re:Working with Qubes OS at the Guardian
by fsflover on Saturday April 06, 2024 @12:13PM
(#39953387)
I do understand air gaping. However I don't understand what you're suggesting to do in practice for The Guardian. Exchange files via QR codes? True air gaping is simply unusable for non-experts. I believe in a reasonable security.
Maybe you're not aware, but The Guardian's job description is obtaining and handling sensitive information. They are experts, ostensibly anyway. Their threat model is rightfully ridiculous and ridiculous threat models require ridiculous security measures such as air gapping which Qubes cannot satisfy. Reasonable is not enough given what they do.
EDIT: Maybe these guys aren't experts and don't deserve to receive and handle sensitive information: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=39954815