The author argues that "computing device", like the Antikythera mechanism, which allow specific formulaic calculations have existed for thousands of years, these devices were purpose made and allowed certain predetermined calculations to be performed automatically. This clearly applies to the Antikythera mechanism.

The author then argues that this categorization is unhelpful as it obscures the line between a purpose made computing device and a general computing device. The arrival of such devices he places at the end of the 1930s with the Z1, which was not made to perform a specific algorithm, but which instead allowed for programmability. Very soon after rapid advances happened, which created the "computer" as a general purpose computing device.

The Antikythera mechanism is essentially irrelevant to the point the author makes.

I understand the point they're making but it's wrong: a computer doesn't have to be universal, to be a computer, neither does having a fixed program, like the Antikythera mechanism, disqualify a device from being a computer. In the same sense, Turing Machines are not necessarily universal; Universal Turing Machines are. But there's no official or formal definition of what a "computer" is and the category is less crisp than the author is trying to make it.

In the same way drawing a line between programmable and fixed-program computer is arbitrary and in fact the author spends much of the article dismissing Babbage's Analytical engine, which was a programmable computer, on the grounds it wasn't actually built; which is, of course, irrelevant, because a physical machine is not necessary for complete computation, as demonstrated by Ada Lovelace.

In any case, the early days of modern computing (1930's- 1940's) were replete with a plethora of computing machinery of various architectures many of which were called "computers", without them being necessarily programmable computers; for example, the "Atanassoff-Berry Computer" [1].

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[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atanasoff%E2%80%93Berry_comput...

Did you read the article? Universality is explicitly rejected as a criterion.

The point is there is a fundamental difference between a computing device which performs a single algorithm and a computer which can perform programmed algorithms.

How about a device that can perform more than one computation then? e.g. the Antikythera mechanism could calculate the motion of the planets, and, separately, eclipses. Universality is the only characteristic that makes a difference, but I think the author avoids this because they don't want to be caught up in debates about whether modern computers are truly universal.

The article is trying to make the distinction between what is, and isn't a "computer" sound crisp and exact, when it's arbitrary and ad-hoc.

Yes, more or less. To quote another commenter in another thread, " an open definition of what a computer is, is too inclusive and uninteresting if you want to talk about the history of actual computers".

Nothing about too much nuance:

«My point was simple: if a cuckoo clock or a differential gear qualifies as a “proto-computer”, what doesn’t meet the bar? Almost any man-made tool performs some sort of a calculation.»

Its about the author arguing that an open definition of what a computer is, is too inclusive and uninteresting if you want to talk about the history of actual computers.

I agree that there's a qualitative difference between a cuckoo clock and a programmable computer, but the difference between a computer and a calculator or a fixed program computer is much less clear and much more open to arbitrary proclamations of what we can call a computer, and what not.

Don't forget that modern computers include all sorts of special-purpose components, like ALUs etc. In the limit, a universal machine is the union of infinite non-universal machines, after all.

> I would guess it was hard to argue that the Antikythera mechanism was not a computer

The simplest argument would be that it was a calculator, not a computer.

Aren’t those synonyms? Just before the arrival of the first actual programmable computers, the word was a job description for people who did calculations.

From https://www.etymonline.com/word/computer

“Earlier words for "one who calculates" include computator (c. 1600), from Latin computator; computist (late 14c.) "one skilled in calendrical or chronological reckoning."”

The Antikythera mechanism can definitely do that.

I would argue that in modern parlance no they are not. We could pick multiple examples of things doing calculations, like cash registers. They sum up numbers. Clearly they do calculations. But are they computers?

Even now, would you say the type of cash registers where numbers are manually entered are computers?

A classical cash register is not the same like the thing we call computer, but that's not my point. My point was that "a computer is a thing that computes while a calculator is a thing that calculates" does not sound correct, the argument is basically the wrong way around. In my opinion, the verbs "to compute" and "to calculate" are synonyms. We only recently started to distinguish between a computer and a calculator, probably being a bit fuzzy and sloppy regarding the term "computer" (as natural languages are). But that doesn't mean that we can transfer that implicit (and maybe altered) meaning back to the verb "to compute".

In Greek, my maternal language, both are called "computers". A calculator is specifically a "κομπιουτεράκι", or small computer, whereas "computer" is "υπολογιστής", literally, "calculator".

In English also the two words' literal meanings are the same, and it's only modern usage that distinguishes them, as sibling comments argue.

Fair point. However, being programmable was one of the requirements listed in the article. Was the Antikythera mechanism actually programmable or was its calculation set in stone through its physical design?

Do medieval programmable music boxes count then? Or perhaps only things that can have branch instructions count

Music boxes weren't programmable in the sense that they allowed for a different algorithm to be performed. They changed the timing of certain operations.

>Or perhaps only things that can have branch instructions count

The author identifies programmability as the most interesting metric, which creates a "computer". Branching is necessary for that but not sufficient.

I think the most objective definition is probably Turing Completeness, but that's a pretty high bar.

I'd start the definition at "varied function and varied input data". Not necessarily branch instructions, the function can be much simpler.

So no, music boxes have no input data.

Music boxes can have input data. Drum with notches is input just as cards with holes is input. They just do not have the other part of varied function.

It might not be fast to replace the input data, but it is possible.

They can if you want them to! It's all semantics.

I personally wouldn't.

My problem with that, is that it is an arbitrary distinction given the title of the article "there were no ancient computers". Of course, if you draw the line at programmable computers, then there were no ancient computers because fixed-program computers are not computers; only, they actually are.

Related, a machinist rebuilt the Antikythera.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ML4tw_UzqZE