That is a good point.
I need to clarify my consciousness about it.
In general I don't think a consciousness needs to be social to react to other consciousness. They might pose a threat or benefit. Say we want to build a dyson sphere and that would disrupt the suns ability to communicate with other suns (also social I know). I try to find better examples ..
Re:Is the Sun Conscious? [pdf]
by colordrops on Friday March 29, 2024 @04:11AM
(#39861692)
Is there any other definition of consciousness than one of a subjective experience that observes and reacts to its environment?
What is a subjective experience? To me, this seems like an infinite regress problem.
Re:Is the Sun Conscious? [pdf]
by MacsHeadroom on Friday March 29, 2024 @08:42AM
(#39863375)
Subjective experience is the awareness of an internal representation.
What is awareness then? Do you see my point? Either you end up with a circle of references or an infinite regress of definitions to describe the ineffable.
It’s the problem of qualia [1]. They can’t really be defined, only pointed at. My experience of seeing the colour red is non-universalizable. Thus the word red can only point at it, it can’t describe or define it.
Re:Is the Sun Conscious? [pdf]
by strogonoff on Friday March 29, 2024 @11:11AM
(#39865021)
I would say there is no working definition of consciousness at all—and potentially there can’t be a complete and provably correct one, if we assume Gödel’s incompleteness theorem is true. The reason is that our arguments about consciousness originate from consciousness itself, we are building a model of the system while being inside of it. The only definitive statement that can be made, I guess, is that consciousness exists.
As far as consciousness that doesn’t react, there are materialist/behaviourist/illusionist views that hold that only observed behaviour matters and anything else may well not exist, but I personally am not convinced by them.
A valid point could be that our consciousness is social (“answering” is a thing), and by extension any alien consciousness we expect would also have to be social as one of the constraints that make it sufficiently human-like.