News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:Recent 'MFA Bombing' Attacks Targeting Apple Users by josephcsible on Wednesday March 27, 2024 @10:19AM (#39839482)
Such a high risk of being locked out permanently is more than most people can stomach. Why can't they offer a last-resort option like showing up in person at an Apple Store with government-issued photo ID?
Re:Recent 'MFA Bombing' Attacks Targeting Apple Users by semiquaver on Wednesday March 27, 2024 @11:08AM (#39840267)

  > Why can't they offer a last-resort option like showing up in person at an Apple Store with government-issued photo ID?
This is easy to defeat and completely subverts the purpose of the system. If you are not comfortable with self-custody then don’t opt in.
Re:Recent 'MFA Bombing' Attacks Targeting Apple Users by nottorp on Thursday March 28, 2024 @11:00AM (#39852453)
Only because you don't have proper IDs over there in the US?

I'd say a lot of identity problems are there because companies have to identify people without an official ID somehow...

Re:Recent 'MFA Bombing' Attacks Targeting Apple Users by toomuchtodo on Wednesday March 27, 2024 @10:23AM (#39839548)
Because they aren’t required to by law. I have filed comments with the FTC that this recovery path should be legally mandated for digital accounts, I encourage others to do the same. It doesn’t have to be an Apple Store (insider risk, see SIM swapping analogy); could be USPS or another government identity proofer they partner with. Login.gov uses USPS for in person identity proofing, for example.

Your data and account ownership interest doesn’t disappear because of failure to possess the right sequence of bytes or a string. Can you imagine if your real estate or securities ownership evaporated because you didn't have the right password? Silliness.

Re:Recent 'MFA Bombing' Attacks Targeting Apple Users by kccqzy on Wednesday March 27, 2024 @12:04PM (#39841025)
Well previously when stock trades involved exchanging physical certificates, I could imagine that ownership could evaporate if you lost that piece of paper. Or just think about cash: you do lose that ownership when you lose that magical piece of paper. It's a simpler world when what you have physically determines what you own.
Re:Recent 'MFA Bombing' Attacks Targeting Apple Users by toomuchtodo on Wednesday March 27, 2024 @12:41PM (#39841459)
People want a just world (imho, n=1, based on all available evidence, etc), recourse, and protections, not a simple world. Interestingly, cash will likely be the last to go in the near future from a “possession of value” as the world goes cashless (although whether this is "good" or "bad" can be argued in another thread).

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cashless_society

Re:Recent 'MFA Bombing' Attacks Targeting Apple Users by jrkatz on Wednesday March 27, 2024 @12:14PM (#39841131)
Physical certificates are not a thing of the past and can be restored upon loss or destruction: https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/investing-ba...
Re:Recent 'MFA Bombing' Attacks Targeting Apple Users by josephcsible on Wednesday March 27, 2024 @12:11PM (#39841098)
If the deed to land or the title to a car gets destroyed, what happens? It doesn't suddenly forever become unownable.
Re:Recent 'MFA Bombing' Attacks Targeting Apple Users by AnthonyMouse on Wednesday March 27, 2024 @04:03PM (#39843903)
This should not be required by law because many people specifically don't want it. I'm content to keep my own redundant copies of a recovery key and suffer the consequences of my own actions, rather than allowing someone to steal my account just because they made a convincing fake ID or hacked some government system. In general centralized identity systems are a single point of failure and hooking more things into them is a bad thing.

> Your data and account ownership interest doesn’t disappear because of failure to possess the right sequence of bytes or a string.

Somehow you have to establish that you are the owner of the account, in a way that nobody else can do it. This is very much not a trivial problem, and government IDs don't provide any kind of solution to it.

If you need a driver's license, how do you get a driver's license? With a birth certificate? Okay, how do you get a copy of your birth certificate when you don't have a driver's license?

If there is a path to go from your house burning down and you having zero documents to you having a valid ID again without proving you've memorized or otherwise backed up any kind of secrets, an attacker can do the same thing and get an ID in your name. This is why identity theft is a thing in every system that relies on government ID. Requiring all systems to accept government ID is requiring all systems to be subject to identity theft.

Re:Recent 'MFA Bombing' Attacks Targeting Apple Users by toomuchtodo on Wednesday March 27, 2024 @04:30PM (#39844220)
I argue for and advocate that this capability should exist, but not be mandatory. If you do not want to tie your personal identity to your digital identity, certainly, you should be able to not do so and rely solely on a cryptographic primitive, recovery key, or other digital mechanism to govern access of last resort. If your account access is lost forever, it's on you and that was a choice that was made.

> Somehow you have to establish that you are the owner of the account, in a way that nobody else can do it. This is very much not a trivial problem, and government IDs don't provide any kind of solution to it.

This is actually very easy. You can identity proof someone through Stripe Identity [1] for ~$2/transaction. There are of course other private companies who will do this. You bind this identity to the digital identity once, when you have a high identity assurance level (IAL). Account recovery is then trivial.

> If you need a driver's license, how do you get a driver's license? With a birth certificate? Okay, how do you get a copy of your birth certificate when you don't have a driver's license?

This is government's problem luckily, not that of private companies who would need to offer account identity bootstrapping. Does the liquor store or bar care where you got your government ID? The notary? The bank? They do not, because they trust the government to issue these credentials. They simply require the state of federal government credential. Based on the amount of crypto fraud that has occurred (~$72B and counting [2]), government identity web of trust is much more robust than "not your keys, not your crypto" and similar digital only primitives.

NIST 800-63 should answer any questions you might have I have not already answered: https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-3/ (NIST Digital Identity Guidelines)

[1] https://stripe.com/identity

[2] https://www.web3isgoinggreat.com/charts/top

(customer identity is a component of my work in financial services)

Re:Recent 'MFA Bombing' Attacks Targeting Apple Users by AnthonyMouse on Wednesday March 27, 2024 @05:47PM (#39845004)
> This is actually very easy. You can identity proof someone through Stripe Identity [1] for ~$2/transaction.

"Pay someone else to do it" is easy in the sense that doing the hard thing is now somebody else's problem, not in the sense that doing it is not hard. That also seems like a compliance service -- you are required to KYC, service provides box-checking for the regulatory requirement -- not something that can actually determine if someone is using a fraudulent ID, e.g. because they breached some DMV or some other company's servers and now have access to their customers' IDs.

> This is government's problem luckily, not that of private companies who would need to offer account identity bootstrapping.

But it's actually the user's problem if it means the government's system has poor security and allows someone else to gain access to their account.

> Based on the amount of crypto fraud that has occurred (~$72B and counting [2]), government identity web of trust is much more robust than "not your keys, not your crypto" and similar digital only primitives.

The vast majority of these are from custodial services, i.e. the things that don't keep the important keys in the hands of the users. Notably this number (which is global) is less than the losses from identity theft in the US alone.

The general problem also stems from "crypto transactions are irreversible" rather than "crypto transactions are secured by secrets". Systems with irreversible transactions are suitable for storing and transferring moderate amounts of value, as for example the amount of ordinary cash a person might keep in their wallet. People storing a hundred million dollars in a crypto wallet and not physically securing the keys like they're a hundred million dollars in gold bars are the fools from the saying about fools and their money.

Re:Recent 'MFA Bombing' Attacks Targeting Apple Users by ohmyiv on Wednesday March 27, 2024 @09:59PM (#39846976)
> If you need a driver's license, how do you get a driver's license? With a birth certificate? Okay, how do you get a copy of your birth certificate when you don't have a driver's license?

Using vitalchek, you can order a BC with a notarized document, using two people who have valid IDs as people to vouch for your identity. I've done it for multiple clients.

Re:Recent 'MFA Bombing' Attacks Targeting Apple Users by AnthonyMouse on Thursday March 28, 2024 @03:46AM (#39848663)
Interesting to see a modern variant of compurgation still in active use.

So if I'm understanding this correctly, if me and one of my friends both have a valid ID, we can get anybody's birth certificate?

Re:Recent 'MFA Bombing' Attacks Targeting Apple Users by ohmyiv on Thursday March 28, 2024 @01:33PM (#39854840)
There also has to be someone that needs the BC to see the notary. But, for the most part, yes, it's that easy to obtain a BC using vitalchek.

Note: The notary will record the ID #s and other info of the two ID holders. So if something goes wrong, the two ID holders will be on the hook as well.

Once the notarized document is submitted to vitalchek, they'll process the request.

Of course, one would still have to know a few details from the BC (parents, location, etc) to get vitalchek to submit the request to the county/city registrar.

Re:Recent 'MFA Bombing' Attacks Targeting Apple Users by AnthonyMouse on Friday March 29, 2024 @06:28AM (#39862441)
> Note: The notary will record the ID #s and other info of the two ID holders. So if something goes wrong, the two ID holders will be on the hook as well.

Though of course this is a method of fraudulently obtaining an official ID, so you do need to be concerned that the people engaged in that sort of enterprise might already have a couple of them.

> Of course, one would still have to know a few details from the BC (parents, location, etc) to get vitalchek to submit the request to the county/city registrar.

Which is the sort of thing that gets collected in big databases which then get breached and published on the internet.

Re:Recent 'MFA Bombing' Attacks Targeting Apple Users by recursive on Wednesday March 27, 2024 @11:33AM (#39840610)
How would this work? If this was possible, that would mean an Apple employee is verifying the ID. This has failure modes. See SIM swapping attacks.
Re:Recent 'MFA Bombing' Attacks Targeting Apple Users by mlyle on Wednesday March 27, 2024 @11:51AM (#39840845)
There's a wide set of possible approaches between "let any employee validate any ID" and "never let someone into an account that they have lost the credential to."

E.g. you could make it costly to attempt, require a notarized proof of identity -and- showing up at the Apple store, and enforce a n-day waiting period. A different employee does the unlock (from a customer service queue) than accepts the paperwork.

We don't lock people out of financial accounts forever when they forget a credential. It could definitely be solved for other types of accounts.

Re:Recent 'MFA Bombing' Attacks Targeting Apple Users by josephcsible on Wednesday March 27, 2024 @11:57AM (#39840932)
Aren't SIM swapping attacks only such a problem because you can get a new SIM without showing up in person with ID?
Re:Recent 'MFA Bombing' Attacks Targeting Apple Users by recursive on Wednesday March 27, 2024 @01:56PM (#39842443)
No, they're also a problem because you can run into a storefront and snatch the employee's authenticated tablet, regardless of what company policy is.
Re:Recent 'MFA Bombing' Attacks Targeting Apple Users by matwood on Wednesday March 27, 2024 @11:20AM (#39840449)
I think their option for last resort is the trusted contact.
Re:Recent 'MFA Bombing' Attacks Targeting Apple Users by lazide on Wednesday March 27, 2024 @10:50AM (#39839996)
Have you seen how easy it is to get fake government ID? It’s damn near a rite of passage for teenagers so they can buy alcohol. $20-$50 if you know the right person or can wander the dark web right.

I’m not sure you want that to be the absolute best digital security you can get.

Re:Recent 'MFA Bombing' Attacks Targeting Apple Users by SoftTalker on Wednesday March 27, 2024 @11:01AM (#39840185)
Yes it is vulnerable to an attacker who is willing to present himself in person with a fake ID to target a specific account. However it's not scalable or remotely exploitable.
Re:Recent 'MFA Bombing' Attacks Targeting Apple Users by lazide on Wednesday March 27, 2024 @11:03AM (#39840208)
Since it requires a human looking at an ID and then pressing a button, the system triggered by the button press is likely quite exploitable no? Or even worse, scanning and storing an ID, which allows spoofing if those get compromised.

Recovery key isn’t susceptible to that - and isn’t susceptible to fake-id-spotting-ability or bribeability of staff either.

Re:Recent 'MFA Bombing' Attacks Targeting Apple Users by josephcsible on Wednesday March 27, 2024 @12:00PM (#39840970)
Okay, then also require a photo when opting in to this, and make sure the person who shows up looks like said photo too.
Re:Recent 'MFA Bombing' Attacks Targeting Apple Users by hedora on Wednesday March 27, 2024 @02:26PM (#39842819)
This is the default behavior if you don't turn this stuff on. They store your account recovery key in an escrow device.

The main problem is that walking into an apple store with a government-issued warrant works just as well as walking in with a government-issued ID.