Your QC process has to be able to catch these things. It’s not like you can avoid any reliability in your process and just lean back and be like “don’t worry bro, it’ll fly, we hired all non-union workers”
I don't think you're charitably reading parent.
Sometimes, the employee is the problem. And sometimes, union contracts preclude changing processes (or make change unnecessarily burdensome) to improve outcomes.
Introducing another party into agreements doesn't come free.
I'm as pro-union as anyone around here... but it is another level of bureaucracy. And sometimes, protecting "our people" can include not letting go people who should be let go (e.g. decreasing headcount in assembly to hire more professional QA people).
That said, solutions do need to come from all levels, and I think unions do provide a necessary counter-pressure to management deciding only employees need to bear the brunt of change.
> where such fatally negligent parasitic workers can be easily shit canned
How charitable of a read does one need to give a comment that uses pejorative and hyperbolic language without providing any substantive refutation?
It takes self control, but walking past the problem is sometimes the more effective solution.
"Man, that asshole on the Internet disagreed with me. I'm going to write a detailed rebuttal of why they're the asshole."
vs.
"Hunh, I wonder why I occasionally get down voted and no one ever responds to me? And also, the responses I do get are a lot nicer in tone than mine..."
That being said, "operator error" as a reason for a problem is heavily discouraged (at least in official reports). Rather, it's typical to blame a human factors issue, commonly one of the "dirty dozen" [0]. I couldn't say exactly which ones are present at Boeing but frankly, from the public reports almost all of them sound applicable. With this in mind, process change is the only appropriate remedy, regardless of what the union thinks. I've never heard any union people get mad at something that improves their job though.
[0] https://skybrary.aero/articles/human-factors-dirty-dozen
In the 787 project they pushed outsourcing of design to their suppliers so they could reduce dependence on their own engineers. That was a disaster. They spun out Spirit Aerosystems to fragment their unionized manufacturing workers. The same Jack Welch influence via Harry Stonecipher sets the management tone even today. It's the wrong culture.
They need to move headquarters and production of their next plane back to the Pacific Northwest, and they need to develop the next plane not in the way that they developed the 787 which was which was designed to be a thumb in the eye of the union and their engineers. It's a cultural problem. Look at the word cultural throughout the FAA report. The culture that Boeing had doesn't work, and they need to change it root and branch.
Airlines are trying to get ahold of the planes built in Everett because the SC plant planes have quality control issues still, ten years in.
Pull the other one.
E.g., Boeing did not 1) classify MCAS correctly in their hazard analysis, and 2) even with their mischaracterized risk in the HA, they did not follow their own procedures to have redundant sensor readings mandatory for the equipment as classified. Those are designer decisions, not some labor-union issue. To my knowledge, those held responsible were relatively high level engineers, implying they were not being protected by the union for their decisions.