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Re:Skiff: Various Privacy Failures by forwardemail on Sunday January 14, 2024 @05:10PM (#38994929)
@cedws I think one of us might be confused with the context here (?) TLS is just a form of encryption to establish socket connections. Please thoroughly read through our article and our source code.

A PGP encrypted email doesn't get "decrypted" when it's being transferred. That's the whole purpose of PGP encryption, to encrypt it before it even gets transferred or stored, which is what we do. If you set up a PGP key, use WKD, then your emails will be stored as encrypted (not only is your database encrypted with your password, but the emails themselves can be PGP encrypted this way), and any sender attempting to send to you will automatically have their message PGP encrypted to you, if it is not already (in case their mail client doesn't use WKD).

Re:Skiff: Various Privacy Failures by cedws on Sunday January 14, 2024 @05:13PM (#38994955)
I think there is a miscommunication. I am not talking about PGP encrypted emails - sure, those can be decrypted client side. Plaintext emails, as the majority of emails are, will be received by your server in plaintext, minus transport encryption. How can you guarantee those will not be intercepted by authorities?
Re:Skiff: Various Privacy Failures by forwardemail on Sunday January 14, 2024 @05:22PM (#38995020)
We use MTA-STS (for inbound AND outbound) with our mode set to enforce[1], to require senders to communicate with us only using TLS encrypted sockets. There is no legal precedence currently requiring software services to implement backdoors.

[1]: https://github.com/forwardemail/mta-sts.forwardemail.net/blo...

Re:Skiff: Various Privacy Failures by binary132 on Sunday January 14, 2024 @10:04PM (#38997021)
Sorry but does that actually address cedws' question about subpoena?
Re:Skiff: Various Privacy Failures by forwardemail on Monday January 15, 2024 @01:19AM (#38997914)
Our policies for law enforcement are publicly available at https://forwardemail.net/en/report-abuse#for-law-enforcement

Also - you should note that we largely operate in-memory and don't store to disk any information or logs (unless essential, e.g. IMAP storage, or if they are error logs). We have all of this in our privacy policy and terms on our website. We are extremely transparent.

Re:Skiff: Various Privacy Failures by binary132 on Monday January 15, 2024 @06:14PM (#39007343)
Memory can still be observed. Encrypted content in memory cannot.