The idea of having masked names was only to prevent race conditions in the initial registration process. After the channel names are registered they are unavailable for other attackers to register and since a verifiable delay has to be done on the name to compute it -- there is adequate time to register the name across multiple servers.
A malicious server can reuse a channel name and have it hijacked by an operator. But the system also ties in ECDSA signatures with a basic threshold consensus algorithm across servers. So having a few servers (or even many) wouldn't allow a malicious third-party to compromise a name.
But there is not a limit for how many channels can exist for a single domain.
>After the channel names are registered they are unavailable for other attackers to register
Yes, but an attacker can use a different channel name for the same domain.
>So having a few servers (or even many) wouldn't allow a malicious third-party to compromise a name.
An attacker could associate their own key with that domain any number of times across any number of servers.
>Yes, but an attacker can use a different channel name for the same domain. >An attacker could associate their own key with that domain any number of times
How?
You literally just register the name again. In the rare chance you conflict just reroll the random nonce and try again.
This blog post would be simpler to understand if you started out without any crypto. If I were to write it I would start with the case of a single IRC server. Then explain a channel is a key and the topic is the value. The first person to register a key on a server can control the value. Then to expand this approach to multiple severs you introduce the idea of using a kdf of the key concatenated with the irc server's identity.
The channel name is something like time_lock(name_meta_data, server_details) -> deterministic channel name based on the parameters passed to the function (output is unique per server.) Just like if you used a hash function you get the same output for the same input. Since the time lock needs a certain amount of compute to elapse (and a certain amount of time to do it) -- it allows time for the name owner to register the appropriate channels on other servers.
Because the information needed to lookup a name is equivalent to the information needed to register the name.
>Registered names aren't visible, only their hashes.
But domains are public information. Imagine if in normal DNS anyone could register google.com at any time. Claiming that its not insecure because people don't know google.com exists doesn't make sense.
>names can be registered atomically across IRC servers without revealing what they are directly.
But if someone learns the name they can register it themself. Two people can both claim to be google.com. If a new IRC server is added anyone can create a channel for an existing domain. If your answer to the problem of the same domain being registered by multiple people is that a domain should be both a name and an encrypted nonce you run into the problem where it might be more convienent to just pass over the public key.
>But your usage of the term here is confusing
That is my fault, I assumed this was a permissionless system where any IRC server was permitted to be used instead of a permissioned one.
>Currently there are no such blockchains that have zero transaction fees to use them.
Some cost near $0. A fork of one could be made to do so.