At first I thought "what does Android 4.0 have to do with critical infrastructure?"

Maybe I've been reading HN too much.

I've never heard that acronym either; I thought it was called SCADA.

I think we just have a general problem with acronyms. I skimmed the article at first, and misread "ABB" as "ADB" because I still was going on the premise of it being "Ice Cream Sandwich."

The unwashed masses say SCADA. Those in the know say Industrial Control Systems. At least that's what I'm told. I'm kind of the unwashed type myself.

> The unwashed masses say SCADA. Those in the know say Industrial Control Systems. At least that's what I'm told. I'm kind of the unwashed type myself.

The terms are often interchanged, even if they shouldn't be. "SCADA" (Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition) is your secondary control and historian/logging system, and will often be in control of sending data across comms links and monitoring events. An ICS (Industrial Control System) is your front-line system in charge of controlling your valves, motors and equipment directly.

The roles have become more blurred together, especially as we move towards more general-purpose equipment and IP-based networks.

I saw ICS and thought they meant Internet Chess Server.

As long as these things don't have a wide adoption or a public facing IP address I don't see the problem. I mean plenty of company's have an windows NT box inside their network running some internal service that nobody want's to pay to upgrade.

At some point it's ok to say if a bank robber is inside the vault with a crow bar, then yea they have access to everyones safety deposit boxes. But, let's just try and keep them out of that room.

The problem with that analogy (and ICS in general) is that indeed the bank robber is outside the bank with a crow bar most of the time (harmless enough), but the safety deposit boxes are poking through the back wall into the alley.

The archaic, closed nature of these systems (and their small user bases and tremendously long refresh cycles) is precisely the source of their vulnerabilities, not a fount of "security through obscurity."

This doesn't seem to surprising to me. A lot of these systems had ad-hoc build systems such that probably nobody can build from source-code (and that's for the shops that were actually using some form of source-control).

This is just one more reason why it's important not to skimp on developer testing, including unit testing (of course they need to include these scenarios in their test cases). Learn how to prevent these cases at http://j.mp/IdJI0j

ok.. so we havethe facts. now who bearsresponsibility for damages? the company using these flawed systems instead of upgrading or pressuring their vendors..... ? at the scale of critical infrastru ture thatcomes down to contractual terms. if the vilns and recommendations have been disclosed, and thatswhat the contract required...... notsellers fwult in my book. fixes arent free, and these decisions will bebased on either a risk analasys, or blind ignorance, depending on who is involved. if products really. are eol and eos, per contract, then fair enough... your license to use them probqblyexpires anyway.

still, hardto paintthis in a good light..... smells bad.

ICS == "industrial control systems"