Re:Running the "Reflections on Trusting Trust" Compiler
by chii on Thursday October 26, 2023 @04:09AM
(#38023025)
but if your threat model includes the key being stolen as a potential threat, then signing with said key would then be meaningless.
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Re:Running the "Reflections on Trusting Trust" Compiler
by nonrandomstring on Thursday October 26, 2023 @05:25AM
(#38023473)
No. In the latter case the "upstream source code" is the key, and the
compiler is the functional transformation under scrutiny. Think of a
triangle where we want two fixed (trustworthy) points to ascertain
the third. Here our trusted principles are a repository (better
multiple repositories) of source code, and a deterministic executable
from someone who has already compiled using a known good compiler.
Re:Running the "Reflections on Trusting Trust" Compiler
by bheadmaster on Thursday October 26, 2023 @06:06AM
(#38023693)
Perhaps, but with deterministic builds, anyone can read the source code, recompile, verify integrity of the signed code, and even sign it themselves as a confirmation of its integrity. The more (independent) signatures there are, the more you can trust the precompiled binary.
Re:Running the "Reflections on Trusting Trust" Compiler
by penteract on Thursday October 26, 2023 @07:50AM
(#38024336)
That argument would mean that SSL transparency logs are pointless.
I'd argue that if the key being stolen/misused becomes more easily detectable, signing with said key becomes more meaningful.
Re:Running the "Reflections on Trusting Trust" Compiler
by charcircuit on Thursday October 26, 2023 @11:19AM
(#38026748)
SSL transparency logs are not a thing.
Certificate Transparency logs only show when new certificates are issued. If a certificate is stolen it is of no use.
Re:Running the "Reflections on Trusting Trust" Compiler
by penteract on Thursday October 26, 2023 @01:02PM
(#38028490)
They help people discover if the certificate authority's private key has been stolen/misused.
Re:Running the "Reflections on Trusting Trust" Compiler
by rocqua on Saturday October 28, 2023 @09:18AM
(#38049561)
They are meant to detect issuers misbehaving, not individual SSL certs leaking.
It lets issuers show they are trustworthy.
Re:Running the "Reflections on Trusting Trust" Compiler
by rocqua on Saturday October 28, 2023 @09:16AM
(#38049548)
It really limits the value of a stolen or leaked key. Similarly it limits the amount of trust you need in the key holder.
If the NSA could steal a debian key (or coerce a packager), without deterministic builds, they could put a backdoor in a popular Debian package with barely any chance of getting caught.
Deterministic builds make it much easier to detect this. That makes the value of such a stolen/coerced key much lower. Making it much less likely this gets attempted, and likely stopping anyone who used to try this attack.