If somebody that wants your data steals your PC he will be likely to find a way to access your personal data. It's a protection against a casual thief that is probably not interested in your data and can't probably even figure out how to bypass the Windows password screen.
But if this doesn't make harm, why not have it? Because having disk encryption enabled by default to a user that doesn't know that is enabled by default is not necessary a good thing. Let's face it: users don't do backups. I know even companies that have all their data on a single server with no backups.
Now if the motherboard breaks and you don't have backup... you can't just take the disk out of that computer, connect to another PC and recover the data. You have lost your data!
But wait, you say Microsoft tought about that, indeed if you signed in with a Microsoft account you can recover your Bitlocker encryption key from the Microsoft portal... wait what? Exactly. No security at all! Microsoft knows your encryption keys and it stores it on their servers... again: false sense of security is worse than no security at all!
Finally, even if this system was 100% secure: do you trust the hardware? The same hardware produced by the same manufacturer of the products where nearly once in a year a big security flaw is discovered? The same hardware where we know that the NSA, and probably other government agencies, placed backdoors?
Whatever, typing a password when booting up the computer (that is once in a day) is such a big deal?
This is complete disinformation. Microsoft gives you the OPT-IN OPTION to save your Bitlocker encryption key to your account.
It's clearly labeled and you need to click on it to activate it:
https://allthings.how/content/images/wordpress/2021/11/allth...
Can't you alternatively also export a copy of the actual disk encryption key and write that on a piece of paper? The last time I used Windows, that was possible, at least (but I think I didn't use the TPM back then).
On macOS, you can do either, for example, and it uses a similar construction (although using Apple's proprietary secure element and hardware encryption engine rather than a TPM and secure boot).
Yes, there are a lot of vulnerabilities in the Secure Boot process on most devices, because the surface area is huge, but the attacker still needs _some sort_ of vulnerability to gain a foothold.
I agree with the frustration in the gist - Secure Boot and TPM-sealed disk encryption aren't nearly as good as they could be, because the surface area is gigantic and sure to get exploited. But this is a classic Security Nerd vs Reality scenario: while it is absolutely _possible_ to pwn Secure Boot + TPM-sealed encryption in almost any scenario, using it still makes it _much harder_ for an attacker to do so, and most will give up.
And the default way of mitigating it is an even worse security risk. Now all your data is on some cloud somewhere, waiting for that vendor to get breached or your account to get phished which is now possible without physical control over your device. Plus, if you couldn't get into your computer because you lost access to your account, you also lost access to the data in the cloud.
Whereas if you really do have sensitive data, you still don't need a TPM and get better security without one. You keep a Yubikey in your pocket or memorize a strong passphrase and then the key physically isn't stored on your device.
Yes, if the NSA has a decent reason to think you're going to nuke a sports game you'll still have a problem with very, very good security measures.
That doesn't mean there isn't a very large in-between zone where you're fine with better security measures.
But it's also their copy of all their bank statements that include their routing number, which nobody who is physically in their house is going to use against them but is a serious fraud risk if it can be accessed remotely on some cloud.
Will this stop a dedicated attacker? Probably not, although a fTPM with an up to date OS would require the attacker to find an exploit for this machine's early boot firmware (UEFI, etc) or burn a Windows zero-day, both of which are very costly.
It does however prevent your casual thief from watching a YT video "how to reset windows password using linux live cd" and then getting access to your sensitive data (browser's saved passwords, etc), so it's a major improvement.
I’d really like Apple’s model on my machine where the root image is just the stock OS image unencrypted and the co-processor owns the responsibility of managing IO (and done efficiently) using my master key. TPM seems like it misses the mark from that perspective.
Yes, with Secure Boot and password your data is safe. But you have to type the password to boot your system, which is impractical for remote and headless systems, or even local systems that need to be available remotely.
This achieves two things: I know that I am typing my password into the OS that I or a trusted third party compiled (not one planted by a hacker), and my home directory gets decrypted as part of my normal login routine.
I'm not sure if this is what Windows actually does, though, or if the TPM just hands over the disk encryption key after Windows passes system attestation and then verifies the screen unlock PIN/password in software – that would be significantly less secure.
The only thing I do not get is why this is not done by a simple SIM card like in any mobile phone. Then one could choose a TPM. Even more: I do not get why I cannot encrypt my android phone with my SIM card.
Hi, it's me the Linux fanboy whose entire personality is making Hackintosh and VM apps for iOS. Just a friendly reminder that attacks on the author's credentials have no baring on the weight of the arguments.
> The reason there is no explicit threat model defined in the TPM specs is because it defines a general-purpose hardware security module
It sounds like you have zero experience in security :)
> it defines a general-purpose hardware security module
No it doesn't. I think you're hinting at HSM which is another beast I may write another fanboy FUD piece about at some point. But no, HSMs are not the same as TPMs. And TPMs are not HSMs. For one thing, and HSM defines something called a trust boundary where keys should never leave. TPMs will happily hand you the keys when you meet a certain condition. HSMs support key migration and provides a secure way to transfer keys from one HSM to another without leaving the trust boundary. I can go on and on...
> TPM's security properties also depend on the rest of the system
The argument isn't TPM versus no security. The argument is TPM versus the existing security you have on Windows. (Passwords, FDE, etc). Of course all this depends on the system. TPM doesn't add anything (* with the exception already listed in the article).
> it at least opens the possibility of making it secure in the future once those vulnerabilities are discovered & fixed
Nope. Architecturally flawed. But I'd just be repeating the argument from the article.
> means a casual attacker can't just pull a drive or reboot the machine and run chntpw or steal sensitive data from discarded drives that haven't been properly wiped
They can with a $80 FPGA. Read the appendix.
> I like the fact that a rogue datacenter employee or intruder can't just pull one of my servers' drives out and get sensitive data.
They can with a $80 FPGA. (Unless your datacenter uses Intel TXT and tboot and other prerequisites that were talked about in the article)
> I like not having to worry about having sensitive keys on the filesystem somewhere
If you use BitLocker, they are always in kernel memory
> derived from the TPM doing remote attestation at boot
That's not what "remote attestation" means :)
> I like not having to worry about unattended reboots or entering LUKS passphrases remotely
If you like that, just disable your password and you'll get the same result
> It sounds like you have zero experience in security :)
Seems like you're countering an ad hominem with an ad hominem here...?
I don't know the TPM specifications in detail myself, but I do know that TPMs are in fact quite general-purpose HSMs, of which assisting in attestation/measurements for the purpose of trusted computing is only one (although certainly the most controversial) subfeature.
If I can store my SSH keys on my TPM and just don't use trusted computing at all... How is that "zero practical security"?
You can create non-exportable keys on TPM's, and there are mechanisms to securely transfer keys between devices.
Granted, doing so is kind of a mess, but nonetheless possible.
Congrats and thanks as I'm fairly sure I must've used your work at some point.
> Just a friendly reminder that attacks on the author's credentials have no baring on the weight of the arguments.
I didn't check nor care about the author nor their credentials because my comment was purely on the piece itself and what it sounded like to me and not an ad-hominem to the author. It did after all contain the usual scary terms such as "Microsoft", UEFI, Secure Boot as well as dismisses an entire concept just because of some flaws that can be rectified incrementally.
> It sounds like you have zero experience in security :)
I never claimed to be a security expert, but maybe my layman's approach allows me to overlook the pedantry and avoid dismissing something entirely just because it doesn't perfectly conform to some ideals? (I think the TPM's threat model will be up to the integrator to determine, as it depends on other things such as discrete vs firmware TPM, UEFI/Option ROMs and their security flaws, etc).
> No it doesn't.
I used "HSM" to mean "dedicated hardware device that does security-related things", rather than a 1-to-1 equivalent of a commercial HSM. But to the best of my knowledge a TPM can also act as a (low-throughput) actual HSM if you so desire, allowing operations with a secret key without ever disclosing it?
> The argument is TPM versus the existing security you have on Windows. (Passwords, FDE, etc)
My argument is that the TPM enables frictionless FDE for the masses without any change in user experience and without even relying on a password (which would often be weak and thus useless in practice).
Tell me how this is the same level of security as no FDE or FDE with weak password. Even if it can be broken using various methods (some of which you've described), surely you see that it still significantly increases the barrier to entry and cost of a successful attack?
> They can with a $80 FPGA. (Unless your datacenter uses Intel TXT and tboot and other prerequisites that were talked about in the article)
Those machines use fTPM which isn't vulnerable to this attack, but regardless, $80 is still more expensive than the $1 a Linux live-CD/USB costs, not to mention the requirement for lengthy physical access and ability to solder/connect wires onto the mainboard.
I'm not arguing that TPM is unbreakable or will resist sophisticated, prepared, targeted attackers. But it raises the bar by at least $80 (and in practice by a lot more on modern machines with fTPM), with zero additional effort from the user (thus it can even be used where conventional passworded FDE is impractical, such as unattended servers). It's literally free security, and yet you chose to shit on it just because it's not perfect (even though the flaws would get patched up over time, as with any product).
I think it would be good if this level of security could become the baseline (even if it's not perfect) and would rather not have FUD getting in the way. You are of course welcome to use something stronger depending on your requirements, but this becoming the baseline is still an improvement over no FDE at all (still seems to be the norm on PCs).
> If you use BitLocker, they are always in kernel memory
Yes I understand, it would still means you'd need to either be root already or have a privilege escalation exploit to extract them.
I'm not necessarily talking about FDE keys here though (for FDE keys, if you can execute code just read the filesystem directly, no need to even care about the FDE).
TPM allows a machine to prove (with reasonable levels of security, requiring at least $80 to break) to another one that it's in a given state, and be able to obtain ephemeral credentials based on that claim, this avoiding needing to persist those anywhere.
> That's not what "remote attestation" means :)
See above.
> If you like that, just disable your password and you'll get the same result
Well no, because then any guy with a Linux live CD can get the data (or someone at the recycler if the drives are swapped and discarded without being sanitized), where as now they'd at least need to shell out 80 bucks plus a soldering iron and lengthy & suspicious-looking physical access to the machine.
There's no reason to believe this will require a TPM or depend on the presence of one. As far as I know, Widewine and similar DRM schemes successfully achieved this without any hardware assistance. Yes, bypasses exist and all the major piracy groups have them, but the objective of preventing the masses from having access to a working bypass is clearly achieved and doesn't require hardware.
The early bypass of widewine meant burning an nvidia shield (invalidating its keys) for each and every single rip.
You need something else (like Apple's FairPlay or Microsoft PlayReady) beyond that, and these definitely check your HDCP version. I believe 4k output commonly requires HDCP 2.2.
FairPlay on macOS might be based on obfuscation still (there was an interesting article on that here some days ago), but high-resolution playback on Windows definitely does involve the GPU driver somehow.
Do you have any references to back that statement up? Software-only DRMs are ultimately always either plain obfuscation or some variant of white-box cryptography, which is also anything but proven to actually work.
But in such a scenario, an attacker can also use such an attack to bypass any remote attestation/DRM/etc!
I guess you could argue that such attacks are too much work for consumers, and that low fences control big dumb animals…but I think, fundamentally, the same argument applies to consumer security functions like FDE!
Tl;dr: I think it’s hard to argue that TPMs are both useless for practical user security and a threat to free computing. It’s gotta be one or the other!
The datacenter use case sounds useful—should have led with that.
My problem with the piece is that it reads like the usual knee-jerk pro-Linux FUD that typically originates around scare words like "Microsoft", "secure boot" and "UEFI".
And it’s not like those “scare words” didn’t become scary for a reason. Your response starts with reverse FUD.
It seems like it's a sunken cost fallacy that big tech spent a lot of money on and they are trying to get it back by convincing average Joe that a TPM is good for your PC.
I thought the piece was ok, but it doesnt add anything new. its another piece pointing at the puzzle a lot of people including you already know exists. its not aimed at you for that matter. (so fair comments, but perhaps a bit harsh?)
The reason there is no explicit threat model defined in the TPM specs is because it defines a general-purpose hardware security module. It is up to integrator to define the threat model (TPM's security properties also depend on the rest of the system) and the application.
Even if a TPM is not perfect and depends on other pieces of the puzzle to also be secure, it at least opens the possibility of making it secure in the future once those vulnerabilities are discovered & fixed. Furthermore, even in this vulnerable state, it still increases the effort required for a successful attack.
Support for TPM-backed full disk encryption means you can now have FDE on by default for everyone with no usability impact at all. Even if it's not secure and a dedicated attack will still break it, it means a casual attacker can't just pull a drive or reboot the machine and run chntpw or steal sensitive data from discarded drives that haven't been properly wiped.
I like TPMs. I like the fact that a rogue datacenter employee or intruder can't just pull one of my servers' drives out and get sensitive data. I like not having to worry about having sensitive keys on the filesystem somewhere because every secret is in memory and is ultimately derived from the TPM doing remote attestation at boot and handing ephemeral keys. I like not having to worry about unattended reboots or entering LUKS passphrases remotely.