Re:TPM provides zero practical security
by vlovich123 on Friday September 08, 2023 @03:04PM
(#37437949)
You would still use the TPM to verify the software chain. But don’t use the TPM to Auto unlock disks. That’s the part that feels like a bad idea
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Re:TPM provides zero practical security
by zamalek on Friday September 08, 2023 @03:39PM
(#37438414)
The issue is that data disks and system disks get conflated. For the system disk (anything outside of /home) you generally only care about signing - which FDE does as a side-effect. Each user should have their own disk/partition/subvolume with a distinct key that is retrieved from the PAM.
This achieves two things: I know that I am typing my password into the OS that I or a trusted third party compiled (not one planted by a hacker), and my home directory gets decrypted as part of my normal login routine.