And the default way of mitigating it is an even worse security risk. Now all your data is on some cloud somewhere, waiting for that vendor to get breached or your account to get phished which is now possible without physical control over your device. Plus, if you couldn't get into your computer because you lost access to your account, you also lost access to the data in the cloud.
Whereas if you really do have sensitive data, you still don't need a TPM and get better security without one. You keep a Yubikey in your pocket or memorize a strong passphrase and then the key physically isn't stored on your device.
Yes, if the NSA has a decent reason to think you're going to nuke a sports game you'll still have a problem with very, very good security measures.
That doesn't mean there isn't a very large in-between zone where you're fine with better security measures.
But it's also their copy of all their bank statements that include their routing number, which nobody who is physically in their house is going to use against them but is a serious fraud risk if it can be accessed remotely on some cloud.
Yes, there are a lot of vulnerabilities in the Secure Boot process on most devices, because the surface area is huge, but the attacker still needs _some sort_ of vulnerability to gain a foothold.
I agree with the frustration in the gist - Secure Boot and TPM-sealed disk encryption aren't nearly as good as they could be, because the surface area is gigantic and sure to get exploited. But this is a classic Security Nerd vs Reality scenario: while it is absolutely _possible_ to pwn Secure Boot + TPM-sealed encryption in almost any scenario, using it still makes it _much harder_ for an attacker to do so, and most will give up.