Re:Keystroke timing obfuscation added to SSH(1)
by dan_quixote on Tuesday August 29, 2023 @12:39PM
(#37310442)
You can commonly deploy the device/server with the client's public key.
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Re:Keystroke timing obfuscation added to SSH(1)
by numpad0 on Tuesday August 29, 2023 @12:43PM
(#37310489)
That's assuming the device runs GNU/Linux with / mounted rw. But not everything is a laptop or a desktop.
Re:Keystroke timing obfuscation added to SSH(1)
by dredmorbius on Tuesday August 29, 2023 @01:38PM
(#37311254)
[delayed]
Re:Keystroke timing obfuscation added to SSH(1)
by fragmede on Tuesday August 29, 2023 @02:51PM
(#37312184)
I don't know. I come across old AP/routers where I've forgotten the login credentials and find myself hard resetting them with some regularly, one that's above "approximately never" anyway.
Re:Keystroke timing obfuscation added to SSH(1)
by dredmorbius on Tuesday August 29, 2023 @10:59PM
(#37317133)
I'm presuming the hard reset is to a factory-assigned password.
Is that uniform across all devices, or device-specific?
Practice I've seen for some years now is to have a label on the device with admin/root password, which is presumably neither uniform across devices nor trivially-determinable from device characteristics (e.g., MAC address, sequential serial numbers, etc.).
I'd still consider that practice reasonably tolerable, though you should be keeping better tabs on assets and credentials.
Re:Keystroke timing obfuscation added to SSH(1)
by samus on Tuesday August 29, 2023 @05:17PM
(#37314249)
It could be totally fine if you disable WiFi and connect physically. At least the first time for setup.
Re:Keystroke timing obfuscation added to SSH(1)
by yjftsjthsd-h on Tuesday August 29, 2023 @01:24PM
(#37311067)
No, it's assuming a device running a ssh daemon with something mounted rw or user-modifiable[0] that can hold an authorized_keys file. A NetBSD embedded board that configures sshd with `AuthorizedKeysFile /sdcard/config/authorized_keys` would be fine, for instance.
[0] For example, you could let the user write their key to an SD card and then mount it ro on the device.
Re:Keystroke timing obfuscation added to SSH(1)
by fragmede on Tuesday August 29, 2023 @02:48PM
(#37312143)
So what do you do when the device has no long-term storage like an SD card?
Re:Keystroke timing obfuscation added to SSH(1)
by samus on Tuesday August 29, 2023 @05:15PM
(#37314229)
Such a device is then simply not suitable for situations where the issues with SSH password authentication become relevant.
Re:Keystroke timing obfuscation added to SSH(1)
by yjftsjthsd-h on Wednesday August 30, 2023 @05:46PM
(#37329587)
What kind of device runs sshd but has no persistent storage?
Re:Keystroke timing obfuscation added to SSH(1)
by marginalia_nu on Tuesday August 29, 2023 @04:51PM
(#37313876)
What if it's mass produced and sold in a store?