Privacy was always a marketing term, just like performance, affordable, future-proof, etc.

It’s a user benefit. By definition that means it’s a marketing term. That is not mutually exclusive with being a general concept.

Also. "Unlimited" doesnt actually mean unlimited.

I learned that when I was like 10:

download free full mp3 album now

(no download just spam, not free, not mp3, not the album you wanted and not now)

That always astounds me - someone expecting me to pay them for something right after I was lied to by them (the ad). Who do those ads target?

Sucker middle managers with more money than brains.

they target idiots.

Yes, like how "all you can eat" doesn't literally mean staying at the restaurant all day and exhausting their supply.

PGP is for security LARPers and doesn't matter at all.

It was good enough for Snowden. Apparently not good enough for the people here who want a centralized server that requires phone numbers run by a hip guy with a cute name.

I'm not a Signal user nor a Moxie fanboy but I believe Snowden used PGP because that's what Laura Poitras used, not because of its technical merits.

So what are some recommendations then? Seems like a lot of talk but not many sources nor suggestions.

Ya, either the parent post is troll, or he read the Vice article from 5 years ago and thinks it nullifies PGP? Not sure, but is it perfect? No. But I don’t think Snowden is a security LARPer.

Snowden also praised Signal several times though…

May I please get a source on this?

"It's not perfect so it's now shit and completely useless."

You can genuinely support privacy and still have features or user cases that don't work. This feature does nothing to weaken privacy.

For other functionality, I will say nothing because it takes time to implement features and Proton is not as big as Google.

But for PGP? You should treat it seriously, considering your target customers.

Agreed. Buried in twiss’ reply above is the actual response to the article:

> though we could of course add that in the future.

Not exactly. The article says:

> It’s absurd that there’s no way to disable this, no option to tell Proton “if you see a multipart/signed or multipart/encrypted message, just leave it the hell alone.”

which, as I said in my response, I disagree with the first half of that. Our goal is to (automatically) encrypt messages whenever possible, and leaving multipart/signed messages alone doesn't reach that goal. So I proposed two different solutions to what OP wants, one of which is already built into Proton Bridge, and one which we could add in the future (but which would be more effort than OP makes it out to be).

Hi - crypto team lead here. I'll hijack this comment to try to explain what Proton Bridge is intended to do, and why it doesn't work like OP wants.

Bridge is a proxy which hosts a local IMAP server, and takes "normal" unencrypted and unsigned messages from desktop MUAs like Thunderbird, signs and encrypts them, and then sends them out. Note that this requires changing the MIME message somehow.

OP writes:

> Everything was great until I decided the other day that I’d also like to do PGP signing on my outgoing messages.

The "intended" way to do this is enable the setting in Proton Mail that says "Sign external messages" :) That way, Bridge will sign them for you. (Internal messages are always signed.)

> Tough luck, bucko, we’re the SECURE email company, you’ll upload your private key to our servers and you’ll like it!

FWIW, private keys are stored encrypted on the server, we don't have access to them.

But yes, the entire goal of Proton is to handle PGP for you, without having to set up PGP encryption and signing manually on all of your devices. I know that the HN audience is fully capable of doing so, but our goal is to make it easier for everyone else :)

> It’s absurd that there’s no way to disable this, no option to tell Proton “if you see a multipart/signed or multipart/encrypted message, just leave it the hell alone.”

IMO, if we see a multipart/signed message, we should still encrypt it whenever possible, not leave it alone. But note that normally in OpenPGP, signing and encrypting is a single operation. It's possible in PGP/MIME to sign a message first and then encrypt it, but we don't support sending that way at the moment, though we could of course add that in the future. But in any case, that's the reason we currently recommend signing using Bridge rather than manually using gpg or similar.

Why can't you just detect that it was already signed with a valid signature, especially if you have the user's public key?

PS: the lack of threading support in your mobile apps is embarrassing, it's been like this for years. No I will never use your web client. Stop trying.

See my last paragraph :)

PS: yes, this is being worked on

^ This is one of those customers you lose on purpose. The comments section in general is full of wonderful behavior, but this is top 5.

Correct. You lose customers on purpose when you don't have basic features that the competition has had for years, and when, after years of delays, you release a new version of your app that still doesn't have this feature.

I don't know why you think this is some sort of gotcha. Other than you think having standards is too entitled.

Can we have a direct (encrypted) IMAP connection please, no bridge, just serve the encrypted messages into my email client.

It's not entirely trivial because for internal messages we don't store them in PGP/MIME format, for performance reasons (e.g. to make it possible to fetch the body separately from the attachments, or one attachment without the others, they are signed and encrypted separately, unlike PGP/MIME which signs+encrypts the whole message in one go). So, if we serve the messages "as-is" it's unlikely that the email client would display them correctly. We're considering trying to standardize (something similar to) our internal format at the IETF, to enable other clients to implement such a format, but again it's not something we can ship overnight.

tbh the reason I expected this to not be a thing is the reason you have given (consequences), hopefully a standard that suits everyones needs comes through at some point. Appreciate the work.

> FWIW, private keys are stored encrypted on the server, we don't have access to them.

I'm always bothered by statements like this because it appears to be skimming over if the provider can perform cryptography with the key. My understanding is that those keys are only decrypted in the users apps/web browser, not server-side. Is that right?

You need to trust that the provider doesn't perform additional operations along side legitimate user triggered actions, which I believe PM handles.

https://proton.me/blog/encrypted-email

Correct, private keys can only be decrypted client-side, we don't have access to the password that they're encrypted with. Otherwise it wouldn't be end-to-end encryption, IMO :)

But you distribute the js that accepts the passphrase - so you could trivially exfiltrate the password - and so access the private key.

"Don't have access" is a little too strongly worded IMNHO.

(I understand the reasoning - and I don't necessarily think it's bad - I just think it overpromises a bit)

Sure, fair enough. I've edited it to "the server doesn't have access". Also, see https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=36643922.

The app ultimately shows you your decrypted email. If client side code is compromised then I don't think this is the thing you worry about

Sending signed and encrypted emails is worse than just reading.

Even if all the decryption resides in the app/web browser side, they can just silently change the code and inject some scripts to hijack the encryption routine.

Although they are open-source and can be scrutinized by anybody, it does not means that's what is run on the server side.

(Just say they have the capability; no accusation)

So at the end of the day, the question is whether you trust Proton or not. Encryption might not help in that case.

Yeah. For web, I've been advocating for something like "Source Code Transparency" (somewhat analogous to Certificate Transparency) in the WebAppSec WG at the W3C. The idea would be that if you could verify that the source code you're getting is the same as what everyone else is getting for a given version of the web app (and has been published in an append-only log of sorts), it would be much more difficult for us to try to compromise any given user without detection.

On mobile, to do such an attack we'd have to collaborate with Apple or Google to do it, which IMHO seems infeasible - but nevertheless also there a "Binary Transparency" feature of sorts might be valuable.

> I've been advocating for something like "Source Code Transparency"

Thank you for moving the web forward. Proton mail does a lot of things well, and there's more to do. I was auditing DANE support and PM was one of the few I found with support.

> > Tough luck, bucko, we’re the SECURE email company, you’ll upload your private key to our servers and you’ll like it!

> FWIW, private keys are stored encrypted on the server, we don't have access to them.

This is frankly fucking ridiculous. Users (including me) have been requesting a change to this for years. It's thanks to this bullshit that ProtonMail's key feature for me is just 'isn't Google'.

private keys, ideally, aren't stored on the server at all