But we can't really predict the future and more loose rules could be introduced by the next government with a totally different agenda who might thank for the previous one for creating this legal framework.
Also, this section is weird too:
> They said sensitive professions, including doctors, journalists, lawyers, judges and MPs, would not be legitimate targets.
Apparently software engineering is not a sensitive job.
We have already been there, it's just like good old phone calls. They can be intercepted under the proper judicial supervision.
I don't have criteria to answer if this is a necessary evil or directly a blatant totalitarian push, but one needs to consider: does the French government have a bad track record of abusing the capability of eavesdropping any phone communication? has this capability been useful for law enforcement?
But any surveillance capability results in “good” as well as bad actors, frustrated with the current limits, asking for just a little more formal power or finding ways to justify informal drift in practice.
The only way to stop surveillance creep is openness and clear principles more coherent than a recursive “well they have been responsible so far, so far as we know” argument.
> does the French government have a bad track record of abusing the capability of eavesdropping any phone communication?
I'd rather look into possible future scenarios, I don't know about past cases, but I don't really follow french politics. I know discussing politics is HN is not encouraged, so I'd just rather suggest to look up what's coming for France (and EU) if the current government fails and major powers switch. Sorry if you already know this.
> has this capability been useful for law enforcement?
In Hungary, Pegasus was used to eavesdrop on many citizens who were simply in an opposing position. Law enforcement is a good cover for data collection and of course can be effective, but we need transparency and safety to see if these tools are abused or not. There are no good answers I'm afraid.
Is it sensitive to compromise a phone, now that there is a national law allowing it, passed through a democratic process?
2-2.5+ million USD depending for a full chain with persistence (lower end of range is for iOS higher end is for Android).
That is probably the lower end of the rough cost to buy that capability which you can use as many times as you want.
https://zerodium.com/images/zerodium_prices_mobiles.png
> Is it sensitive to compromise a phone, now that there is a national law allowing it, passed through a democratic process?
The technology itself is sensitive, when you buy a full chain exploit like the ones that have the public bounty price above, if it gets burnt it's useless for everyone else who bought it after its patched.
Generally exploit brokers don't like it when you burn their exploits.
Is that a lot?
In the US the major cities have police budgets of between $200 million and $5 billion
Yeah and most have this capability generally considering both the costs and the little amount of use you'd have for it.
You'd expect something more federal like the NSA, CIA or the FBI to have this kind of capability which is why its kinda a big deal when normal cops get it.
I would say most didn't have this capability because it's illegal. In France it is now legal
If the population does not support the law, the government could be potentially replaced.
But the most probable conclusion is that the population at large would not care.
It would have to be after compromise, which would mean its likely only used on a very small number of cases due to the sensitivity and cost of the technology involved.